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UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN INTER-
NATIONAL AGREEMENTS PROVIDING
RIGHTS FOR WOMEN
by Malvina H. Guggenheim* and Elizabeth F. Defeis**
I. INTRODUCTION
A number of international agreements presently in effect and rati-
fied by many countries, provide for political, social, and economic rights
for women. In addition, the United Nations Commission on the Status
of Women has prepared a comprehensive agreement, the Convention
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
presently in draft form. The United States had, until recently, not rati-
fied any of these agreements, except for the United Nations Charter, and
a convention dealing with white slavery. In 1976-following Interna-
tional Women's Year-the Senate, after many years of inaction, gave
its advice and consent to United States ratification of the Convention
on Political Rights of Women and the United States finally ratified it.
Although the Convention on Political Rights of Women did not provide
any new rights, its ratification was strenuously opposed by the Ameri-
can Bar Association on the same grounds that had long been urged in
opposition to United States ratification of all human rights conventions.
Its ratification may, therefore, be of considerable significance. For the
first time the United States has affirmed in a binding international agree-
ment that women's rights, as one aspect of human rights, are a matter
of international concern and an appropriate subject for treaty regulation.
This article will discuss the rights provided for by the Convention
on Political Rights of Women and the other international agreements
on women's rights. And, it will analyze the constitutional arguments
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that have been made against United States ratification of such agree-
ments and the effect such ratification would have on existing United
States law.
II. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS PROVIDING
RIGHTS FOR WOMEN
A. Existing Conventions
1. The United Nations Charter
The most significant and widely ratified international agreement
making reference to the fights of women is the United Nations Char-
ter. The preamble "reaffirms" the faith of the members of the United
Nations in "fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
human person, [and] in the equal rights of men and women . ..."I
It is noteworthy that equality of rights for men and women is placed
on the same plateau as fundamental human rights and the dignity
of the human person. Article 1, setting forth the purposes of the
United Nations, enumerates as one of these purposes, "promoting and
encouraging respect for human fights and for fundamental freedom for
all without distinction as to . . . sex"'2 as does Article 55.3
The General Assembly is directed to "initiate studies and make rec-
ommendations for the purpose of . . .assisting in the realization of
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as
to . .. sex . .. ,, and under Article 56 "[a]ll members pledge them-
selves to take joint and separate action . . . for the achievement of the
purposes set forth in Article 55."5 The Charter also provides specif-
ically that the United Nations itself "shall place no restrictions on the
1. U.N. CHARTER, preamble. The Charter was signed at San Francisco, June 26,
1945, and entered into force October 24, 1945. The United States ratified the Charter
on August 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031 (1945).
2. U.N. CHrARE, art. 1 (emphasis added).
3. Id. art. 55. This is also included among the "basic objectives" of the trusteeship
system. See id. art. 76.
4. Id. art. 13.
5. The extent to which this article imposes an affirmative obligation on members has
been the subject of considerable divergence of opinion. See Hudson, Charter Provisions
on Human Rights in American Law, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 543 (1950); Wright, National
Courts and Human Rights-the Fuiii Case, 45 AM. J. IN'L L. 62 (1951); Note, Human
Rights and Freedoms Provisions of the United Nations Charter, 3 ALA. L. Rnv. 158
(1950); Note, U.N. Charter Invalidates Allen Land Law, 2 STAN. L. REv. 797-810
(1950); Recent Cases, 26 TnM,. L.Q. 184 (1952); Recent Cases, 100 U. PA. L. REv.
1247 (1952).
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eligibility of men and women to participate in any capacity and under
conditions of equality in the principal and subsidiary organs." As is
evident from this summary, with the exception of the last mentioned
provision, the Charter provisions dealing with the rights of women are
very broad and general in scope.
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
7
This covenant, adopted by a resolution of the General Assembly
in 1966,8 is a broad charter of basic civil and political rights. It encom-
passes most of the rights contained in the United States Bill of Rights,
but extends well beyond those. In addition to providing rights for the
criminally accused similar to those provided by the Bill of Rights,9
the convention also guarantees the right to appeal, 10 and the right to
6. U.N. CHARTER art. 8. The composition of the United Nations Secretariat itself
does not reflect an equal representation of women. Only nine of two hundred seventy
nine senior staff positions are held by women. "No woman has ever been Secretary
General and only one of the undersecretaries is a woman. A woman was first ap-
pointed to this level in 1972. See Composition of the Secretariat, Report of the Secre-
tary General, U.N. Doe. A/9120, at 21 (1973).. See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1976, at
19, col. 1-6.
On December 8, 1975, the General Assembly passed a new resolution requesting the
Secretary General to increase the number of women in professional posts. See 13 U.N.
Mo. CHRON. 63 (Jan. 1976).
7. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
8. Id.
9. The Convention guarantees the "liberty and security" of the person, id. art. 9; bars
arbitrary arrest, id.; requires that anyone arrested be informed of the charges, id. art.
9; and be brought promptly before a court, id.; that everyone shall have a right to a
fair and public hearing before an impartial tribunal, id. art. 14; presumed innocent until
proven guilty, id.; be informed in detail of the charges against him, id.; be tried without
undue delay, id.; have assistance of counsel of his own choosing, id.; have counsel ap-
pointed, id.; have the right to obtain the attendance of and to examine witnesses, id.;
have the right against compelled self-incrimination, id.; against double jeopardy, id.;
against ex post facto laws, id. art. 15; and against cruel, inhuman, and degrading punish-
ment, id. art. 7. The last provision is, arguably, broader than the "cruel and unusual"
provision of the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution, as punishment
may be degrading even when not cruel and unusual.
10. Id. art. 14. In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), the Supreme Court held
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires states to provide an
indigent with a free transcript on appeal and in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963), that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment requires states to
provide indigents with free counsel for the first appeal, if such review exists, but it has
never held that the state must provide a forum for appellate review. The question
whether the Constitution requires appellate review is, however, academic since'all states
in the United States have provided for such review. See ABA PRoJzcr ON Mn, r u
STANA s vop. CR iNA_ Jus cg 17 (1967).
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compensation for unlawful arrest or detention." The convention pro-
tects the first amendment freedoms' 2 but also provides for the right of
self-determination,' 3 the right to dispose of property,' 4 the right to na-
tionality at birth, 15 the right to move freely within a country" and the
right to leave a country. 17  It prohibits slavery,"' forced or compulsory
labor,1" unlawful interference with privacy, family, or honor and rep-
utation,2" propaganda for war,2' or advocacy of national, racial or re-
ligious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or
violence.22
Several provisions make specific reference to rights of women. For
example, provisions guarantee to all citizens, without distinction on the
basis of sex, inter alia, the right to take part in the conduct of public
affairs, 23 to vote and to be elected, 24 and to have access to public serv-
ices. 25 It also requires states "to insure equality of rights and re-
sponsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at dis-
solution."' 2" However, the major importance of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to women is not so much in these
particular provisions, but rather in two general provisions. These pro-
vide that all states who are parties to the covenant "undertake to en-
sure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil
and political rights set forth in it.' '27  Moreover, in addition to requiring
11. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, art. 9, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966). In the United States such a right may exist under tort law. See Bivens v.
Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1970).
12. Those first amendment guarantees encompassed in the convention are freedom
of thought, id. art. 18; freedom of expression, id. art. 19 (which provides that "this
right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of
all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, or in print, in the form of
art, or through any other media . . . ."); freedom of association, id. art. 22; freedom
of peaceful assembly, id. art. 21; and freedom of religion, id. art. 18.
13. Id. art. 1.
14. Id.
15. Id. art. 24.
16. Id. at 12.
17. Id.
18. Id. art. 8.
19. Id.
20. Id. art. 17.
21. ld. art. 20.
22. Id.
23. Id. art. 25.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. art. 23.
27. Id. art. 3. The same guarantee is also contained in the clause barring discrimina-
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states to ensure equality with respect to the rights guaranteed by the
convention, it provides that "the law shall prohibit any discrimination
and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against dis-
crimination on any ground such as . . . sex."
2 -8
In sum, the convention specifically guarantees certain rights to
women, enumerates a broad spectrum of rights which must be- accorded
equally to men and women, prohibits all discrimination based on sex,
and requires states to provide effective protection against such discrim-
ination. Clearly, its impact on women's rights could be enormous.
The covenant came into force on March 23, 1976 after having been
ratified by the necessary 29 thirty-five states. 30
3. International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights3'
As a companion to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights is a charter of basic rights in the economic,32 social, 33 and cul-
tural areas.34 It was adopted as a resolution of the General Assembly
tion. Article 2(1) provides:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recog-
nized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, prop-:
erty, birth or other status.
Id. (emphasis added).
28. Id. art. 26.
29. Id. art. 49 states the requirement of thirty-five states for effectiveness.
30. MULTILATERAL TREATIES IN RESPECT OF WHICH THE SECRETARY GENERAL PER-
FORMS DEPOSITORY FuNcroNS 95-96 (December 31, 1974) [hereinafter cited as
MULTILATERAL TREATIES], as updated, 12 U.N. Mo. CHRON. 53 (May 1975), id.
at 53 (June 1975), id. at 51 (July 1975), id. at 46 (Aug. 1975), id. at 28 (Nov. 1975);
13 U.N. Mo. CHRON. 73 (Jan. 1976). Countries ratifying are Barbados, Bulgaria, Byelo-
russian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia,
Denmark, Ecuador, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, German Democratic Repub-
lic, Hungary, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Republic, Mad-
agascar, Mali, Mauritius, Mongolia, Norway, Romania, Rwanda, Sweden, Syrian Arab
Republic, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics, Uruguay, Yugoslavia. Id.
31. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
32. The parties recognize the right to work, id. art. 6; the right to just and favorable
conditions of work, id. art. 7; and the right to social security, id. art. 9.
33. Social rights include the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living, id.
art. 11; the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, id.
art. 12; and the right of everyone to an education, id. art. 13.
34. These include the right of everyone to take part in the cultural life, to enjoy the
benefits of scientific progress and its application, and to benefit from any scientific, lit-
erary, or artistic production of which he is the author. Id. art. 15.
6 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10
and was opened for ratification in 1966. 3r The parties recognize the
right to work, the right to just and favorable conditions of work, the
right to social security, the right of everyone to an adequate standard
of living, the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health, the right of everyone to an education, and the right of
everyone to take part in the cultural life, to enjoy the benefits of
scientific progress and its application, and to benefit from any scientif-
ic, literary, or artistic production of which he is the author.30 The
parties further recognize that marriage must be entered into with the
free consent of the spouses, that special protection should be accorded
to mothers during a reasonable period before and after childbirth, 7
and that special measures of protection and assistance should be taken
on behalf of children."' The covenant requires the states who are
party to the convention to ensure fair wages and equal remuneration for
equal work,89 equal promotional opportunities, 40 safe and healthy work-
ing conditions, 41 rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working
hours, 42 the right to form and join trade unions, 43 the right of trade
unions to function freely,44 and the right to strike. 45 It provides that
the states party to the covenant shall take measures to improve methods
of production, conservation and distribution of food,40 to reduce still
births and infant mortality,47 to improve environmental and industrial
hygiene,48 to prevent and control disease,4 9 and to assure availability
of medical care to all." It would make primary education compulsory5'
and require that secondary and higher education be made generally avail-
able and equally accessible to all. 2
35. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
36. Id.
37. Id. art. 10.
38. Id. art. 10.




43. Id. art. 8.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. art. 11.




51. Id. art. 13.
2. Id.
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With respect to women's rights, two provisions are particularly signif-
icant. One is the general provision which requires states to "undertake
to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all
economic, social and cultural rights set forth . . . in the Covenant,""m
and to guarantee that the rights will be exercised without discrimination
of any kind as to sex.54 The other is the clause in the provision dealing
with wages, specifically reiterating the requirement of "equal remuner-
ation for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in partic-
ular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those
enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work."55  The covenant
came into effect in 1975, when it was ratified by thirty-five states" 6 as
required by Article 27. 7
The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the,Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights encompass many rights and are
not limited to rights for women. Several more narrowly drawn conven-
tions in effect among a number of states deal specifically with rights for
women.
4. Convention on the Political Rights of Women58
The Convention on the Political Rights of Women, drafted by the
Commission on the Status of Women59 and adopted by the General
53. Id. art. 3.
54. Id. art. 2.
55. Id. art. 7.
56. MuLTILATERAL TREATInS, supra note 30, at 90, as updated, 12 U.N. Mo.
CHRON. 53 (May 1975), id. at 53 (June 1975), id. at 51 (July 1975), id. at 46 (Aug.-
Sept. 1975), id. at 28 (Nov. 1975); 13 U.N. Mo. CHRON. 73 (Jan. 1976).
In total, thirty-seven states have ratified: Australia, Barbados, Bulgaria, Byelorussian
Soviet Socialist Republic, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Den-
mark, Ecuador, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, German Democratic Republic,
Hungary, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Republic, Mada-
gascar, Mali, Mauritius, Mongolia, Norway, Philippines, Romania, Rwanda, Sweden,
Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Uruguay, Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia. Id.
57. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 49, art. 27, U.N. Doe. A/6316
(1966).
58. Convention on the Political Rights of Women, opened for signature Mar. 31,
1953, 193 U.N.T.S. 135. For the history and a detailed analysis of the provisions of
the convention, see Daw, Political Rights of Women: A Study of the Internat'l Protec-
tion of Human Rights, 12 MALAYA L. RaV. 308 (1970).
59. U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/124, at 7 (1949). The Commission on the Status of
Women was established in 1946 by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC),
pursuant to Article 68 of the Charter of the United Nations. Its specific mandate
was to prepare recommendations and reports to the ECOSOC "on promoting women's
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Assembly,"0 provides that "[w]omen shall be entitled to vote in all elec-
tions on equal terms with men . ... 61 "Women shall be eligible for
election to all publicly elected bodies . . . on equal terms with
men . . ."62 and they "shall be entitled to hold public office and to
exercise all public functions . . . on equal terms with men .... ,,.
The convention came into force on July 7, 1954.64 As of October 1,
1975, the convention had been ratified by seventy-eight countries. 6"
5. Convention Against Discrimination in Education6"
This convention, adopted by the United Nations Scientific and Cul-
tural Organization on December 14, 1960, is much broader than the
rights in political, economic, civil, social and educational fields . . . with the object
of implementing the principle that men and women shall have equal rights .... " U.N.
DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 1946-47, 529
(1947). Its members, expanded to thirty-two from the original fifteen are elected by the
ECOSOC for a three-year term, one-third being elected each year from representatives of
all regions of the world. The Commission on the Status of Women drafted the Declara-
tion on the Elimination of Discrimination of Women, unanimously adopted by the Gen-
eral Assembly, November 7, 1967. It also proposed and helped draft the Convention on
the Political Rights of Women (1952), the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Mini-
mum Age for Marriage, and Registration of Marriages (1962) and the Convention on
the Nationality of Married Women (1957). It is now preparing the proposed Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.
60. The General Assembly adopted the convention, as amended, by the ECOSOC and
the Third Committee on December 20, 1952. 7 U.N. GAOR Supp. 20, at 28, U.N. Doc.
A/2334 (1952).
61. Convention on the Political Rights of Women, opened for signature Mar. 31,
1953, art. I, 193 U.N.T.S. 135.
62. Id. art. II.
63. Id. art. III.
64. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 30, at 379. Article VI of the convention
provides that it comes into force after ratification by six states. Convention on the Po-
litical Rights of Women, entered into force, July 7, 1954, art. VI, 193 U.N.T.S. 135.
65. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 30, at 379-81, as updated, 12 U.N. Mo.
CHRON. 51 (July 1975), id. at 46 (Sept. 1975). Countries which have ratified are: Af-
ghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Central African Republic,
Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Repub-
lic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Federal Republic of Germany, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Ger-
man Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India,
Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Republic of Korea, Laos, Lebanon,
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mongolia, Nepal, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania,
.Senegal, Sierra Leone, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago,
Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Zambia. Id.
66. ,Convention Against -Discrimination in Education, adopted Dec. 14, 1960, 429
U.N.T.S. 93.
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name implies as it encompasses not only discrimination in education
but the availability and quality of education as well. For example, it
requires states to provide free and compulsory primary education, to
make secondary education generally available and accessible, to ensure
that all public educational institutions of the same level have equivalent
standards of education, and to provide training for the teaching profes-
sion.07 Particularly relevant to women's rights is the requirement that
"in order to eliminate and prevent discrimination," the parties will un-
dertake to abrogate any statutory provisions and to discontinue any ad-
ministrative practices which involve discrimination in education, and to
ensure that admission of pupils to educational institutions is non-discrim-
inatory. 8 Discrimination is defined, inter alia, as any "distinction, ex-
clusion, limitation or preference . . . based on . . . sex . . "09 The
convention does permit separate educational institutions for pupils of
different sex, provided, that institutions have equally qualified staff and
premises and equipment of the same quality. 70 The convention came
into force on May 22, 1962.71 As of April 30, 1975, sixty-three states
had ratified it.72
6. Labor Conventions
A number of conventions, promulgated by the International Labor
Organization (ILO), 73 are concerned with the rights of women. Thus,
67. Id. art. 4.
68. Id. art. 3.
69. Id. art. 1.
70. Id. art. 2.
71. Id. at 94 n.1.
72. Interview with Ms. Frykholm, Librarian, UNESCO, December 23, 1976. Coun-
tries which have ratified are: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Re-
public of the Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark,
Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Guinea,
Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic,
Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malta, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi
Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic,
United Kingdom, Venezuela, Republic of Viet-Nam, Yugoslavia. Id.
73. The International Labor Organization (1LO) was established in 1919 by the Treaty
of Peace of Versailles. The United States was one of the founding states. The governing
body is composed of twenty-four representatives of government, twelve representatives of
employers, and twelve representatives of workers. The United States has recently notified
the ILO of its intention to withdraw. See Binder, U.S. to Tell I.L.O. It Plans to Quit,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1975, at 6, col. 1. A member is required to give such notice two
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the Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women
Workers for Work of Equal Value74 requires members to "ensure
the application to all workers of the principle of equal remunera-
tion for men and women workers for work of equal value. ' 75 The con-
vention was adopted by the ILO on June 29, 1951 and came into force
on May 23, 1953. As of June 30, 1976 it had been ratified by eighty-
nine states.
76
There are two other ILO conventions having broad application and
significantly affecting rights of women, one on discrimination"7 and the
years before actual termination of membership. ILO CONST. art. 1. For a detailed study
of the history of the ILO, see A. ALcocK, HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR OR-
OANIZATION (1971).
74. 165 U.N.T.S. 303, adopted June 29, 1951.
75. Id. art. 2. The full text of the article is:
1. Each Member shall, by means appropriate to the methods in operation for
determining rates of remuneration, promote and, in so far as is consistent with such
methods, ensure the application to all workers of the principle of equal remunera-
tion for men and women workers for work of equal value.
2. This principle may be applied by means of-
(a) national laws or regulations;
(b) legally established or recognised machinery for wage determination;
(c) collective agreements between employers and workers; or
(d) a combination of these various means.
It is not clear whether this enumeration of means in section 2 defines and limits the
clause "by means appropriate to the methods in operation for determining rates of
remuneration . . ." or the clause "in so far as is consistent with such methods
." in section 1 of the article. If it does not modify the former clause, the article may
be interpreted, not as an absolute mandate for equal pay but as requiring equal pay for
equal work only insofar as this can be accomplished and still be consistent with methods
for determining remuneration presently existing in each country.
76. International Labour Convention, Chart of Ratifications, as of Jan. 1, 1974,
[hereinafter cited as Labour Convention], as updated, LVII ILO OFFICIAL BULL. 11
(1974), LVIII ILO OFmcIAL BULL. 11-15 (1975), LIX ILO OFFICIAL BULL. 77-79
(1976). Countries ratifying include: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, People's Republic
of Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic,
Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslavakia, Dahomey, Denmark,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic
Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana,
Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Iraq, Israel, Italy,
Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Libyan Arab Republic, Luxembourg, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Nor-
way, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Spain, Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Re-
public, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, United Kingdom, Upper Volta, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia. Id.
77. Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupa.
tion, adopted June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 32.
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other on employment policy. 78 Under the Convention Concerning
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, each member
undertakes to declare and pursue a national policy designed to promote,
by methods appropriate to national conditions and practice, equality of
opportunity and treatment in respect of employment and occupation,
with a view to eliminating any discrimination in respect thereof.
79
The methods enumerated in the convention8 ° include,
(b) to enact such legislation and to promote such educational pro-
grammes as may be calculated to secure the acceptance and observance
of the policy;
(c) to repeal any statutory provision and to modify any administrative
instructions or practices which are inconsistent with the policy;
(d) to pursue the policy in respect of employment under the direct
control of a national authority .... 81
Two caveats to this general proscription on discrimination are (1) that
special measures of protection provided for in other ILO Conventions
or recommendations are not to be deemed discrimination and (2) that
a member may, after consultation with employers' and workers' organ-
izations,
determine that other special measures designed to meet the particular
requirements of persons who, for reasons such as sex.., are generally
recognized to require special protection or assistance,
are needed. 82  The discrimination convention came into force June 15,
1960.3 It has been ratified by eighty-eight states.8 4
78. Convention Concerning Employment Policy, adopted July 9, 1964, 569 U.N.T.S.
65.
79. 362 U.N.T.S. 32, art. 2. "Discrimination" is defined to include, inter alia, "any
distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of ... sex . . . which has the
effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or
occupation .... ." Id. art. 1. Employment and occupation are defined to "include ac-
cess to vocational training, access to employment and to particular occupations, and
terms and conditions of employment." Id. art. 1.
80. Id. art. 3.
81. Id.
82. Id. art. 5.
83. Id. at 32 n.1.
84. Labour Convention, supra note 76, as updated, LVI ILO OmcrL BULL. 11-15
(1975), U.X ILO OicirAL BuLL. 77-79 (1976). Countries which ratified the conven-
tion are: Afghanistan, Algeria, People's Republic of Angola, Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada,
Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus,
Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia,
Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana,
12 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10
The Convention Concerning Employment Policy85 requires each
member to "declare and pursue, as a major goal, an active policy de-
signed to promote full, productive and freely chosen employment."
8
Members should aim at ensuring, inter alia, that "there is freedom of
choice of employment and the fullest possible opportunity for each
worker to qualify for and to use his skills and endowments in, a job for
which he is well suited, irrespective of . . . sex . . ... 8 The con-
vention came into force on July 15, 1966.8
S
Other ILO conventions, narrower in scope, treat such matters as em-
ployment of women at night,89 employment of women underground,90
employment of women before and after childbirth,9 and insurance for
widows and orphans.92
The Convention Concerning Night Work of Women Employed in
Industry,9" revised in 1948, prohibits the employment of women,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel,
Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kuwait, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagas-
car, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands,
Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Democratic Republic of the
Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,
Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Upper
Volta, Venezuela, Republic of Viet-Nam, Yemen Arab Republic, Yugoslavia. Id.
85. 569 U.N.T.S. 65, adopted July 9, 1964.
86. Id. art. 1.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 66 n.1.
The United States is not a party to this convention. A congressional injunction of
secrecy was removed June 2, 1966; the convention is now in the Foreign Relations
Committee. CCH CONGRESIONAL INDEX 1633 (1971-72).
89. Convention Concerning the Employment of Women During the Night, adopted
Nov. 28, 1919, 38 U.N.T.S. 67; Convention Concerning Employment of Women During
the, Night, adopted June 19, 1934, 40 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention Concerning Night Work
of Women Employed in Industry, adopted July 9, 1948, 81 U.N.T.S. 147.
90. Convention Concerning the Employment of Women on Underground Work in
Mines of all Kinds, adopted June 21, 1935, 40 U.N.T.S. 63.
91. Convention Concerning the Employment of Women Before and After Childbirth,
adopted Nov. 29, 1919, 38 U.N.T.S. 53.
92. Convention Concerning Compulsory Widows' and Orphans' Insurance for Persons
Employed in Industrial or Commercial Undertakings, in the Liberal Professions and for
Outworkers and Domestic Servants, adopted June 29, 1933, 39 U.N.T.S. 259; Conven-
tion Concerning Compulsory Widows' and Orphans' Insurance for Persons Employed in
Agricultural Undertakings, adopted June 29, 1933, 39 U.N.T.S. 285.
93. 81 U.N.T.S. 147, adopted July 9, 1948. The two other conventions which deal
with performance of night work by women are the Convention Concerning the Employ-
ment of Women During the Night, adopted Nov. 29, 1919, 38 U.N.T.S. 67, and the
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regardless of age, "during the night in any public or private indus-
trial undertaking ... other than an undertaking in which only
members of the same family are employed." 4  "Night signifies a pe-
riod of eleven consecutive hours at least seven of which fall after ten
o'clock in the evening and before seven o'clock in the morning. 5  Ex-
ceptions are permitted for force mageure,9" where because "of serious
emergency the national interest demands it,"'97 or where the work is
"necessary to preserve 'rapidly deteriorating' materials from certain
loss.9 8 In an industrial undertaking of a seasonal nature and where ex-
ceptional circumstances demand, the night period may be reduced to
ten hours for a sixty day period each year.9 9 In countries where the
climate makes day work particularly trying, there may be a shorter
night period if compensatory rest is allowed during the day. 00 The
convention is not applicable to women in health and welfare services
who are not normally engaged in manual work' 01 or to women "holding
responsible positions of a managerial or technical character.' 0 2  The
Convention Concerning Employment of Women During the Night, adopted June 19,
1934, 40 U.N.T.S. 3.
These three conventions are basically similar. The differences are not relevant here.
The prohibition of night work for women was the first protective measure to be made
the subject of an international convention. See International Convention Respecting the
Prohibition of Night Work for Women in Industrial Employment, signed Sept. 26, 1906,
21 Gr. Brit. T.S. 345. The later conventions provide that if a country that has ratified
a convention subsequently ratifies a later version, its ratification of the earlier is deemed
denounced.
94. Convention Concerning Night Work of Women Employed in Industry, adopted
July 9, 1948, art. 3, 81 U.N.T.S. 147.
"Industrial undertaking" as defined in article 1 includes:
(a) mines, quarries, and other works for the extraction of minerals from the earth;
(b) undertakings in which articles are manufactured, altered, cleaned, repaired, or-
namented, finished, adapted for sale, broken up or demolished, or in which ma-
terials are transformed, including undertakings engaged in shipbuilding or in
the generation, transformation or transmission of electricity or motive power
of any kind;
(c) undertakings engaged in building and civil engineering work, including con-
structional, repair, maintenance, alteration and demolition work.
The competent authority shall define the line of division which separates in-
dustry from agriculture, commerce and other non-industrial occupations.
Id. art. 1.
95. Id. art. 2.
96. Id. art. 4.
97. Id. art. 5.
98. Id. art. 4.
99. Id. art. 6.
100. Id. art. 7.
101. Id. art. 8.
102. Id. This provision was not contained in the earlier versions of the convention.
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convention came into force on February 27, 1951.03 As of June 30,
1976, fifty-one states had ratified it. 0 4
The Convention Concerning the Employment of Women on Under-
ground Work in Mines of all Kinds' provides that "[nlo female, what-
ever her age, shall be employed on underground work in any mine."100
Exceptions are made for women in training, in health and welfare serv-
ices, in management, and for others who may occasionally enter non-
manual work.1 7  The convention came into force on May 30, 19371"8
and had been ratified by seventy-eight states'0 9 as of June 30, 1976.
.Under the terms of the Convention Concerning Maternity Protec-
tion, 1 0 a woman employed in any industrial or commercial undertak-
103. Id. at 148 n.1.
- 104. Labour Convention, supra note 76. Countries ratifying are: Algeria, Austria,
Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil,- Burundi, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Egypt,
France, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, India, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Libyan Arab Republic, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Mauritania, New Zea-
land, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal,
Republic of South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Uruguay,
Republic of Viet-Nam, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia. Id.
105. 40 U.N.T.S'. 63, adopted June 21, 1935.
106. Id. art. 2.
* 107. Id. art. 3.
* 108. Id. at 70.
109. Labour Convention, supra note 76, as updated, LVII ILO OFFICIAL BULL. 12
(1974), LVIII ILO OFFICIAL BuLL. 237 (1975), LIX ILO OFFIc I. BULL. 29, 77-80
(1976). Countries ratifying are: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangla-
desh, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cam-
eroon, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hon.
duras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon,
Lesotho, Luxembourg, Malawi, States of Malaya, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland,
Portugal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Republic of South Africa, Spain, Sri
Lanka, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrain-
ian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Republic of Viet-Nam, Yugoslavia, Zambia. Id.
110. Convention Concerning Maternity Protection, adopted June 28, 1952, 214
U.N.T.S. 321. An earlier convention, Convention Concerning the Employment of
Women Before and After Childbirth, adopted Nov. 29, 1919, 38 U.N.T.S. 53, deals with
the same subject. Its provisions are substantially similar to those of the maternity pro-
tection convention. It was ratified by twenty-eight states and is in effect for those
ratifying states that have not ratified the maternity protection convention. Labour
Convention, supra note 76.
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ing"' is entitled to a period of maternity leave of at least twelve weeks,
with a minimum of six weeks compulsory leave following her confine-
ment. 1 2 Moreover, while on maternity leave, she must be paid cost
benefits fixed by national law, and sufficient for the "full and healthy
maintenance" of mother and child." 3 She may not be dismissed while
absent from work during this period." 4  If she nurses "she shall be
entitled to interrupt her work for this purpose, at. . .times to be pre-
scribed by national laws . . ... 15 The convention came into force on
September 7, 1955116 and has been ratified by fifteen states."
7
Laws regulating the hours and places of permissible work for
women, though originally deemed protective, have more recently been
criticized as discriminatory. Such laws place restrictions on women in
two ways: (1) they absolutely bar women from certain types of work
and (2) they may cause employers not to hire women for other types
of work because of the special conditions imposed on the employer em-
ploying women. Doubt has been expressed about the continued valid-
111. "Industrial undertaking" is defined as:
(a) mines, quarries, and other works for the extraction of minerals from the earth;
(b) undertakings in which articles are manufactured, altered, cleaned, repaired, or-
namented, finished, adapted for sale, broken up or demolished, or in which ma-
terials are transformed, including undertakings engaged in shipbuilding, or in
the generation, transformation or transmission of electricity or motive power
of any kind;
(c) undertakings engaged in building and civil engineering work, including con-
structional, repair, maintenance, alteration and demolition work;
(d) undertakings engaged in the transport of passengers or goods by road, rail, sea,
inland waterway or air, including the handling of goods at docks, quays,
wharves, warehouses or airports.
214 U.N.T.S. 321, art. 1.
112. Id. art. 3.
113. Id. art. 4. The medical benefits must include prenatal, confinement and post-
natal care, hospitalization where necessary, and freedom of choice between a public and
private hospital. Id.
114. Id. art. 6.
115. Id. art. 5.
116. Id. at 322 n.1.
117. Labour Convention, supra note 76. Countries ratifying are: Austria, Bolivia,
Brazil, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Ecuador, Hungary, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, Mongolia, Spain, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, Uruguay, Yugoslavia. ld.
The ILO Convention Concerning Conditions of Employment of Plantation Workers,
adopted June 24, 1958, 348 U.N.T.S. 275, reproduces the provisions contained in the
maternity protection convention. It also provides that no pregnant woman shall be re-
quired to undertake any type of work harmful to her in the period prior to her maternity
leave. Id. art. 47.
The ILO Convention Concerning Minimum Standards of Social Security, adopted June
28, 1952, 210 U.N.T.S. 131, also contains provisions dealing with maternity leave. Id.
art. 10.
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ity of ILO instruments that emphasize protection of women rather than
non-discrimination.""
There are two conventions treating compulsory widows' and orphans'
insurance. One of these covers persons employed in argricultural under-
takings."' The other covers persons employed in industrial or commer-
cial undertakings in the liberal professions and out-workers and do-
mestic servants.' 20 Under both conventions, all ratifying states agree
to set up and maintain a scheme of compulsory widows' and orphans'
insurance. Detailed provisions cover who may be excluded, what con-
ditions may be imposed, and how the insurance shall be financed. Both
require that the pension, together with non-exempt means of the pen-
sioner, must be sufficient to cover her essential needs. 2' The conven-
tion for persons employed in agricultural undertakings came into force
on September 29, 1949.122 As of June 30, 1975, six states had ratified
it. 2  The convention for persons in commercial undertakings came
into force on November 8, 1946.124 As of June 30, 1975, seven states
had ratified it.' 5 A separate convention provides for establishment
of international machinery for maintenance of rights under these con-
ventions.'20
In addition to those conventions described above which concern par-
ticularly the rights of women, a number of ILO conventions provide
118. See U.N. Doe. E/CN.6/513/Add. 1, at 10 (1968). Most recently, several
countries criticized a protective provision of the Draft Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women for that reason. Thus, France stated
that the "article justifies discrimination instead of fighting it." U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/591,
at 14 (1976).
119. Convention Concerning Compulsory Widows' and Orphans' Insurance for Per-
sons Employed in Agricultural Undertakings, adopted June 29, 1933, 39 U.N.T.S. 285.
120. Convention Concerning Compulsory Widows' and Orphans' Insurance for Per-
sons Employed in Industrial or Commercial Undertakings, in the Liberal Professions and
for Outworkers and Domestic Servants, adopted June 29, 1933, 39 U.N.T.S. 259.
121. Id. art. 22; Convention Concerning Compulsory Widows' and Orphans' Insur-
ance for Persons Employed in Agricultural Undertakings, adopted June 29, 1933, art.
22, 39 U.N.T.S. 285.
122. 39 U.N.T.S., at 308.
123. Labour Convention, supra note 76. Countries ratifying are: Bulgaria, Czechos-
lovakia, Italy, Peru, Poland, United Kingdom. Id.
124. 39 U.N.T.S., at 282.
125. Labour Convention, supra note 76. Countries ratifying are: Bulgaria, Czechos-
lovakia, Ecuador, Italy, Peru, Poland, United Kingdom. Id.
126. Convention Concerning the Establishment of an International Scheme for the
Maintenance of Rights Under Invalidity, Old-Age, and Widows' and Orphans' Insurance,
adopted June 22, 1935, 40 U.N.T.S. 73.
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that states ratifying them will undertake to apply them equally to men
and women.1
2 7
7. Marriage, White Slavery and Prostitution
There are various conventions treating marriage, white slavery and
prostitution. The Convention on the Nationality of Married Women
28
provides that "neither the celebration nor the dissolution of a marriage
between . .. nationals . .. [of different states] nor the change of na-
tionality by the husband during marriage, shall automatically affect the
nationality of the wife.' 29 Under laws existing in many countries, a
wife automatically acquired the nationality of her husband and her
rights were governed by the law of his country.'3 0 Some women were
even barred from returning to their original countries on their hus-
band's death because, under the law of their homeland, they lost that
nationality upon marrying a foreigner.' The convention came into
force on August 11, 1958.132 As of June 30, 1975, forty-nine states
had ratified it.'
3
127. See, e.g., Convention Concerning Conditions of Employment of Plantation
Workers, adopted June 24, 1958, 348 U.N.T.S. 275. An ILO report to the Commission
on the Status of Women states that "there are now 13 ILO Conventions and 144 Recom-
mendations which cover most of the main spheres of labor and social policy and which
have been widely accepted in national law and practice. Almost all of these apply to
women as well as men without distinction...." U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/556 (1971).
128. Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, done Feb. 20, 1957, 309
U.N.T.S. 65 (1957).
129. Id. art. 1.
130. See, e.g., Finland: Act of May 9, 1941, § 3, concerning the acquisition and
loss of Finnish citizenship; Indonesia: Act No. 3 of April 10, 1946, art. 2(1), concern-
ing citizens and residents of Indonesia; Korea: Nationality Law No. 16 of Dec. 20,
1948, art. 3(l). Under Ethiopian law, a woman married to a foreigner may still lose
her nationality. An alien wife, but not an alien husband, automatically acquires the
nationality of her Ethiopian husband. U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/592, at 27-28 (1976). A
United States statute, Citizenship Act of 1907, Ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228 provided for
automatic loss of citizenship by a woman upon a marriage to a foreign national under
certain circumstances. This statute was repealed in 1922. See notes 402-06 infra and
accompanying text.
131. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/389, at 3-8 (1962). Most nationality laws now allow a
woman to regain her pre-marital nationality upon the death of her husband or the dis-
solution of the marriage. Id. at 35-37.
132. MULTIrATERAL TREATIES, supra note 30, at 388. Article 6 of the convention
provides that the convention comes into force after ratification by six states. 309
U.N.T.S. 65, art. 6.
133. MULTLATERAL TREATIES, supra note 30, at 388-89, as updated, 12 U.N. Mo.
CHRON. 28 (Feb. 1975). Countries ratifying are: Albania, Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cuba, Cyprus,
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The Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Mar-
riage and Registration of Marriages, 134 provides that no marriage shall
be entered into without the full and free consent of both parties,3 9 that
no marriage shall be entered into by any person below the minimum
age specified by legislation in each of the countries party to the con-
vention, 13 6 and that all marriages shall be registered. 3 7  The conven-
tion came into force on December 9, 1974, 18 and as of June 30, 1975,
twenty-seven states had ratified it.'" 9
The Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and
of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, 40 superseding several
earlier conventions on the same subject,' 4 1 obligates the parties to pun-
ish any person who, for the satisfaction of another, procures, entices,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Federal Republic of Germany,
Fiji, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Hungary, Ireland,
Israel, Jamaica, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Swaziland,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania,
Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,
Yugoslavia, Zambia. Id.
134. Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registra-
tion of Marriages, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1962, 521 U.N.T.S. 231 (1962).
135. Id. art. 1.
136. Id. art. 2.
137. Id. art. 3.
It should be noted, however, that an exception is allowed "where a competent author-
ity has granted a dispensation as to age, for serious reasons, in the interest of the intend-
ing spouses." Id.
138. MuLTILATERAL TREATIms, supra note 30, at 338. Article 6 of the convention
provides that the convention comes into force after ratification by six states. 521
U.N.T.S. 231, art. 6.
139. MULTILATERAL TRFATES, supra note 30, at 391. Countries ratifying are: Ar-
gentina, Austria, Brazil, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Repub-
lic, Federal Republic of Germany, Fiji, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Mali,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Trinidad
and Togabo, Tunisia, United Kingdom, Upper Volta, Western Samoa, Yugoslavia. Id.
140. Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation
of the Prostitution of Others, opened for signature Mar. 21, 1950, 96 U.N.T.S. 271.
141. Id. art. 28. Earlier conventions are superseded as between those states that rat-
ify this later convention. The superseded conventions are listed in the Preamble:
1. International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, signed
May 18, 1904, as amended, May 4, 1949, 92 U.N.T.S. 19.
2. International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, signed
May 4, 1910, as amended, May 4, 1949, 98 U.N.T.S. 109.
3. International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Chil-
dren, concluded Sept. 30, 1921, as amended, Nov. 12, 1947, 53 U.N.T.S. 39.
4. International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full
Age, concluded Oct. 11, 1933, as amended, Nov. 12, 1947, 53 U.N.T.S. 49.
Id. preamble, at 272.
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or leads away another person for purposes of prostitution, or exploits
the prostitution of another person, although that person consents.
142
There is also an obligation to punish any person who keeps, manages, or
knowingly finances a brothel or rents premises for the purpose of prosti-
tution.14 13  Attempts to commit these acts and intentional participation
are also to be punished to the extent permitted by domestic law. 4  Other
provisions of the convention deal with repeal of existing law which re-
quires registration of persons engaged in prostitution,'45 use of foreign
convictions for multiple-offender treatment,' 46 extradition, 47 transmis-
sion of letters of request, 4 " exchange of information between coun-
tries, 149 prevention of prostitution and rehabilitation of victims of prosti-
tution,150 and temporary care, maintenance and repatriation of destitute
victims of international traffic in persons.' 5 ' The parties also under-
take to adopt immigration and emigration measures necessary to pre-
vent traffic in persons of either sex for the purpose of prostitution.
152
The convention came into force on July 25, 1951.-1 As of June
30, 1975, forty-two states were party to it.' 4 Although the United
States has not ratified this convention, it has ratified an earlier conven-
tion which is similar. 55
142. Id. art. 1.
143. Id. art. 2.
144. Id. art. 4.
145. Id. art. 6.
146. Id. art. 7.
147. Id. art. 8.
148. Id. art. 13.
149. Id. art. 15.
150. Id. art. 16.
151. Id. art. 19.
152. Id. art. 17.
153. MULTLATERAL TREATIES, supra note 30, at 193. Article 24 of the convention
provides that the convention comes into force after ratification by two states. 96
U.N.T.S. 271, art. 24.
154. MULTATERAL TREATimS, supra note 30, at 193-94. Countries ratifying are: Al-
bania, Algeria, Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Re-
public, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic,
Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, India, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Republic,
Malawi, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Republic of
Korea, Romania, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic,
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Upper Volta,
Venezuela, Yugoslavia. Id.
155. The International Agreement for the Suppression of White Slave Traffic, done
May 18, 1904, 35 Stat. 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 496, as amended, The Protocol, signed
May 4, 1949, [19511 2 U.S.T. 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 2332, 92 U.N.T.S. 19. MurLTr.ATEPAI.
TREATIES, supra note 30, at 186-87.
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B. The Draft Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women'56
At its last two sessions the United Nations Commission on the Status
of Women has been considering a draft of the Convention on the Elimi-
nation of Discrimination Against Women.' 5 7 This treaty encompasses
most of the guarantees contained in existing conventions and defines ad-
ditional fights. The draft contains alternative texts on a number of ar-
ticles, but in general it provides that the states party to the convention
shall condemn discrimination against women and shall (1) initiate "by
all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrim-
ination against women mn all its forms . . .;"1 (2) repeal all provisions
of national penal codes that discriminate against women;'"9 (3) take
measures to combat traffic in women; 60 (4) ensure to women equal
fights politically;'" (5) ensure to women equal rights economically,
including equality in employment opportunities and remuneration;, -"
(6) provide equal educational opportunities for women; 1 3 (7) ensure
equality before the law;' 64 (8) foster equality in determining when,
whether and who to marry and foster equality during marriage; and (9)
promote "equality in rights pertaining to rearing children. 65 It also con-
tains some general provisions, such as that "[s]tates [p]arties shall under-
156. For the text of the convention, see COMM'N ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT
ON ThE TwENTY-FiFrT SEssION, Jan. 14-Feb. 1, 1974, 56 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 4, at 32,
U.N. Doc. E15451 (1974) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT].
157. The draft convention, based on earlier drafts submitted by the Philippines and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, was prepared by a working group composed of
fifteen members of the Commission. The group met for five days prior to the twenty-
fifth session of the Commission. Id. at 29.
The Commission asked the Secretary General to obtain comments on the draft from
the member-states of the United Nations, specialized agencies and non-governmental
organizations and to prepare a working paper based thereon for the consideration of the
Commission at its twenty-sixth session. The Secretary General did so. See E/CN.I
6/591 (1976). By May, 1976, the date on which the report was prepared, forty govern-
ments (not including the United States), several agencies of the United Nations, and ten
non-governmental organizations sent in responses analyzing the draft convention, article
by article, and authoring various amendments. Id. at 6-43.
158. Id. art. 2.
159. Id. art. 6.
160. Id. art. 7.
161. Id. art. 8.
162. Id. art. 11.
163. Id. art. 10.
164. Id. art. 15.
165. Id. art. 16.
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take, in the social, economic, cultural and other fields, all appropriate
measures to ensure the adequate development and advancement of wom-
en .... -" and that
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to educate public
opinion and to direct national aspirations towards the eradication of
prejudice and the abolition of customary and all other practices which
are based on the idea of the inferiority of women .... 167
While this convention is still in draft form and not open for ratifica-
tion, most of the rights provided therein are contained in the conven-
tions already discussed as well as in the Declaration on the Elimination
of Discrimination Against Women. The declaration is not legally
binding on states to the same extent as a convention ratifiedby the
state would be. Nevertheless, as a declaration, unanimously adopted
166. Id. art. 3.
167. id. art. 5. The draft contains two alternative proposals for implementing the
convention. Under the first, states parties to the convention would submit reports on
"legislative, administrative and practical measures which they have adopted implement-
ing the provisions of the present Convention" to the Secretary General every four years.
Id. art. 21. Under the second proposal, a Committee on the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of Discrimination Against Women would be established and states would submit
a report on the "legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures which they have
adopted and which give effect to the provisions of this Convention" for consideration
by the Committee. Id. This alternative provides for submission of a report "every two
years and whenever the Committee so requests" and empowers the Committee to request
further information from states. Id.
Elsewhere it has been suggested that the convention should provide more effective
means for implementation, such as a provision modeled on the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights or on the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination. Such a means might vest the Commission on the Status of
Women, or a committee established for that purpose, with authority to consider allega-
tions by states parties to the convention, or by individuals, that a state is not fulfilling
its obligations under the covenant. See Guggenheim, The Implementation of Human
Rights by the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women: A Comment, 12 TEx. INT'L
LU.- (1976).
The states responding to the Secretary General's request for comments on the draft
convention, see note 157 supra, "fully endorsed" the need for periodic review of the
progress made by the Parties in implementing the provisions of the convention. E/CN.
6/591, at 38 (1976). However, the creation of a committee on the implementation of
the convention was controversial. Some states objected to the creation of the committee,
believing that control over implementation should be by the Commission. Others thought
an independent committee of experts would be desirable. Id. at 39. The Netherlands
suggested that consideration be given to devising a procedure similar to that laid down
in Article IX of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of
the Crime of Apartheid. Reference was also made to the system of implementation pro-
vided for in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination. Id. at 39-40.
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by 1 11 states, it carries great moral force and, according to some views,
legal force.' 68
It is evident from this summary that there are a number of interna-
tional agreements, ratified by many countries, which require states to
accord women equality in the political, economic, and educational
spheres. Since treaties are the supreme law of the land in the United
States and supersede inconsistent law, United States ratification of these
agreements would override inconsistent state and federal laws and
guarantee equality for women in these areas. It is therefore relevant
to examine (1) -the arguments that there are Constitutional impedi-
ments to United States ratification of such agreements and (2) what
impact ratification would have on existing United States law.
II". CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS PERTAINING
TO RATIFICATION
Of the above agreements, only the United Nations Charter and
the International Agreement for the Suppression of White Slave Traffic
have been ratified by the United States prior to 1976. None of the four
major agreements dealing specifically with women's rights-the Conven-
tion on the Political Rights of Women, 69 the Convention Against Dis-
crimination in Education,17 1 the Convention Concerning Discrimination
in Respect of Employment and Occupation,' 71 or the ILO Convention
Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for
Work of Equal Value' 7 2-and none of the major human rights conven-
tions-the Genocide Convention, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, and the International Convention on the Elimina-
168. Some authorities have taken the position that United Nations resolutions, par-
ticularly if accepted by a large number of states and if frequently cited, constitute cus-
tomary international law. See Bleicher, The Legal Significance of Re-Citation of Gen-
eral Assembly Resolutions, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 444 (1969). Cf. Sohn, The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 8 INT'L COMM'N Julusrs J. 17 (Dec. 1967).
169. Convention on the Political Rights of Women, entered into force July 7, 1954,
193 U.N.T.S. 135. See notes 58-65 supra and accompanying text.
170. Convention Against Discrimination in Education, entered into force May 22,
1962, 429 U.N.T.S. 93. See notes 66-72 supra and accompanying text.
171. ILO Convention No. 111 Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment
and Occupation, adopted June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31. See note 77 supra and accom-
panying text.
172. ILO Convention No. 100 Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women
Workers for Work of Equal Value, adopted June 29, 1951, 165 U.N.T.S. 303. See notes
74-76 supra and accompanying text.
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tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination-had been ratified by the
United States, despite extended and repeated efforts by those who sup-
port United States ratification of human rights conventions. 173 Op-
ponents of United States ratification of these conventions have taken
the position that the United States lacks power under the Constitution
to ratify such treaties. In the main, they have made three arguments:
(1) that these treaties involve matters within the domestic jurisdiction
of the United States,' 74 (2) that they involve the reserved powers of
the states, 175 and (3) that they are not of international concern. Those
opposed to ratification view these arguments as limitations on the scope
of the treaty power.176
A. The Domestic Jurisdiction Myth
Of the treaties specifically dealing with women's rights, only one, the
Convention on the Political Rights of Women,7 7 has been submitted
to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratify. 78 President Kennedy
requested the Senate's advice and consent to this convention, the Sup-
plementary Slavery Convention, and the Convention Concerning the
Abolition of Forced Labor in July, 1963. In his letter of transmittal
to the Senate, President Kennedy emphasized the importance of United
States ratification of these conventions.' 7 9 Dean Rusk reported that
173. The Genocide Convention was first submitted by President Truman to the Senate
for its advice and consent in December, 1948. In 1970 President Nixon renewed the
request. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the convention in
1950 and 1970. See Hearings on the Genocide Convention Before a Subcomm. of the
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). The Committee reported
favorably upon the convention in 1971 and 1973. See S. ExEc. REP. No. 25, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1970); S. Exac. REP. No. 5, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). In 1974, the con-
vention reached the Senate floor where it was debated in the Senate, but a vote on ratifi-
cation was barred by a filibuster. A cloture vote to cut off debate failed to receive the
necessary two-thirds majority. See 120 CONG. REc. 1372 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974). The
American Bar Association finally reversed its position by an overwhelming vote of the
House of Delegates on February 17, 1976. The matter is now back in the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1976, at 30, col. 2.
174. See notes 177-98 infra and accompanying text.
175. See notes 199-224 infra and accompanying text.
176. See notes 230-53 infra and accompanying text.
177. Convention on the Political Rights of Women, opened for signature Mar.
31, 1953, 193 U.N.T.S. 135. See notes 58-65 supra and accompanying text.
178. 109 CONG. RiEc. 13046 (1963).
179. President Kennedy's letter of transmittal stated in pertinent part:
United States law is, of course, already in conformity with these conventions, and
ratification would not require any change in our domestic legislation. However, the
fact that our Constitution already assures us of these rights does not entitle us to
stand aloof from document which project our own heritage on an international
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ratification of the convention involved no legal restrictions and was
in compliance with the Constitution.18 0  After hearings before a sub-
committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at which a
number of witnesses representing numerous citizen organizations as
well as several bar associations appeared in support of United States
ratification of the Convention on the Political Rights of Women,' 8' all
scale. The day-to-day unfolding of events makes it ever clearer that our own wel-
fare is interrelated with the rights and freedoms assured the peoples of other na-
tions.
These conventions deal with human rights which may not yet be secure in other
countries: they have provided models for the drafters of constitutions and laws in
newly independent nations: and they have influenced the policies of governments
preparing to accede to them. Thus, they involve current problems in many coun-
tries.
They will stand as a sharp reminder of world opinion to all who may seek to
violate the human rights they define. They also serve as a continuous commitment
to respect these rights. , There is no society so advanced that it no longer needs
periodic recommitment to human rights.
The United States cannot afford to renounce responsibility for support of the very
fundamentals which distinguish our concept of government from all forms of tyr-
anny. Accordingly, I desire, with constitutional consent of the Senate, to ratify
these Conventions for the United States of America.
Hearings on Executive J, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Convention On the Political Rights of
Women, Executive K, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Convention Concerning the Abolition of
Forced Labor, and on Executive L, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Supplementary Slavery Con-
vention, Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess., at 39-40 (1967), in HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Subcomm. Hearings].
180. Dean Rusk's report on the Convention on the Political Rights of Women states:
No substantive legal questions are involved in the United States becoming a party
to this convention. Article I, relating to the right of women to vote, merely reflects
the principle established by the 19th amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, which provides:
"The right of the citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex."
Id. at 2-3. For a discussion of the impact of the Convention on Political Rights of
Women in United States law, see notes 266-91 infra and accompanying text.
181. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 179. See, e.g., Statement of Ms. Judith Nies of
the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom before the Senate Committee:
The continuing failure to act by formally ratifying these human rights conventions
can only be interpreted as a refusal and lack of moral commitment to promote the
basic rights of individuals throughout the world. In addition, she will soon have
forfeited any right to future discussion or influence in the field of International Hu-
man Rights.
Id. at 80. See also Statement of Terence H. Benbow, Chairman, Comm. on Int'l Law
of the New York State Bar Ass'n:
No provision of any of these conventions conflicts with express limitations in the
Constitution of the United States. In fact, the conventions express limitations on
the United States and the States which are already contained in our Constitution
and particularly the Bill of Rights.
Also, after a considerable review we have found nothing in these conventions in-
consistent with any existing Federal statute.
Id. at 84. See also Statement of Marvin Schick of the American Civil Liberties Union:
[WMe firmly believe that United States ratification of the Human Rights Con-
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three conventions were ordered reported favorably to the full Foreign
Relations Committee.182 However, the American Bar Association (ABA),
which had not appeared before the Subcommittee, appeared before the
full Committee, opposing ratification of the Convention on the Political
Rights of Women. s3 The ABA resolution submitted to the Board of
Governors by the Standing Committee on Peace and Law through the
United Nations gave as the reason for such opposition that the conven-
tion was "concerned with matters essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of the United States . *."..",4 Eberhard P. Deutsch,
Chairman of the ABA Committee on Peace and Law through the
United Nations, had prepared that committee's report opposing ratifica-
tion 18 5 and appeared on behalf of the ABA before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. In response to a question, he agreed that ratifi-
cation of this convention would have no effect on United States law:
ventions is urgently needed if only to remove the anomaly of this country being
one of the few members of the UN not to have ratified any of the Human Rights
Treaties. This refusal is in stark contrast to our expression of support of the world
organization and the provisions of its charter and also to the real advances in so-
cial and political rights that have been made in this country through domestic legis-
lation. Because the three Treaties under consideration are so clearly in accord with
principles that we all espouse, it is difficult to understand the delay in securing sena-
torial action.
Id. at 195. See also Statement of Andrew J. Biemiller, Director of Legislation, AFL-
CIO, Washington, D.C., id. at 156; Resolution of the Alaska Bar Ass'n, id. at 197; State-
ment of John Carey on behalf of The Comm. on Int'l Law of the Ass'n of the Bar of
the City of New York, id. at 199; Statement of the Bar Ass'n of the District of Colum-
bia, id. at 225.
182. Subconm. Hearings, supra note 179, at 1.
As Mr. Abrams, the United States representative to the United Nations Commission
on Human Rights noted in his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee,
Not one of the witnesses before the Subcommittee opposed the ratification of any
of the three conventions, but, to the contrary, all strongly urged that our country
join the great number of others that have become parties to these elementary human
rights instruments. I think it significant that no local bar association opposes their
ratification, and at least seven that I know of have endorsed ratification.
Id. at 116,
183. The American Bar Association supported ratification of the Supplementary Slav-
ery Convention and recommended that the United States take no action on the Conven-
tion Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor. Proceedings of the House of Delegates
at 1967 Annual Meeting, 92 A.B.A. REP. 316, 342-43 (1967). In so doing, the House
of Delegates adopted the recommendation of the Section on International and Compara-
tive Law. The ABA Standing Committee on Peace and Law Through the United Nations,
headed by Eberhard Deutsch, had recommended against U.S. ratification of all three
treaties. The ABA position was adopted after extensive debate, in which the Attorney
General of the United States, a number of past presidents of the ABA, and the then
President-elect of the ABA argued in favor of ratification. See Proceedings, 62 AM.
Soc. OF INT'L LAW 106 (1968).
184. 92 A.B.A. REP. 515 (1967).
185. Id. at 338.
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Senator Dodd: I would like to get down to the hard ground on this
convention respecting women. Can you give us any citation of any
State or Federal law that would be overridden by the United States
becoming a party to that treaty?
Mr. Deutsch: None whatever, sir.
Senator Dodd: I don't understand it. If there is no possibility of any
conflict why do you oppose the convention?
Mr. Deutsch: The opposition to that convention is based on the prin-
ciple' that it deals with the domestic affairs of the United States and not
because it might change some law existing within the United States
today. Under the 19th amendment, Senator, every person is entitled
to vote regardless of sex in every state. No state could pass a valid law
to that effect. [sic] But that doesn't mean we ought to make a treaty
to that effect. 186
Similarly, the report of the annual meeting of the House of Delegates
states that "Mr. Deutsch conceded that these particular treaties were
'relatively innocuous.'" He said "that the Committee's objection to
these treaties was that they concerned matters that were purely domes-
tic. The issue was one of constitutional polity ....
There is, of course, nothing in the Constitution limiting treaties to
matters not within the "domestic jurisdiction" of the United States. In-
deed, the argument that treaties cannot or should not deal with matters
within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States' 84--it is not en-
tirely clear which position the ABA was taking-misconceives the
structure of international law and the function of treaties. The inter-
national community as a whole, unlike individual states, does not have
a lawmaking body. To a large extent, that function is performed by
treaties. Indeed, some states, as for example the Soviet Union, take
the position that only treaties or rules of customary law to which the
state has given explicit consent are binding.8 9 Treaties, therefore, are
186. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 179, at 34.
187. 92 A.B.A. REP. 338 (1967).
188. The report of the ABA Committee on Peace and Law through the United Na-
tions, authored by Mr. Deutsch, stated:
The third convention, namely that dealing with the political rights of women,
goes even further in its attempts to regulate the political regimes of states which
become parties to it. It is difficult to conceive of any area more peculiarly within
the domestic jurisdiction.
He continued:
The question remains, however, whether, under our Constitution, the political
rights of women in this country can be made a matter of international concern by
the ratification of a treaty on the subject with the advice and consent of the Senate.
1 INT'L LAw. 600, 610 (1967), quoting 92 A.B.A. REp. 521 (1967).
189. See K. Gazvnowsnr, SOVIET PmLc INTERNATIONAL LAw, DocrnmNs AND
DIPLOMATIC PRAcncE 27-28 (1970).
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one of the major means of creating international law. With the excep-
tion of treaties codifying existing customary international law, treaties
are ipso facto agreements by states to be bound internationally on mat-
ters which, in the absence of the treaty, were not regulated by interna-
tional law, and were thus within the domestic jurisdiction of the state.
By adhering to a treaty on the matter, a state consents to subject to
international law something which, in the absence of the treaty, was
subject to domestic law only. 9'
The term domestic jurisdiction appears in the United Nations Char-
ter and in what is generally referred to as the Connally Amendment
to the United States Declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdic-
tion of the International Court of Justice. Article 2 of the Charter
provides:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the "domes-
tic jurisdiction" of any state. 1 '
However, this article deals with the powers of the United Nations and
not with what the United States can or cannot do constitutionally. The
Connally Amendment states, inter alia:
Provided, that this declaration shall not apply to
(b) disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the
190. See Advisory Opinion on Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco, [1923]
P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 4, at 24. The same confusion was evident in the arguments of those
who took the position that the Jackson Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.
§ 2432 (Supp. IV, 1974), which conditioned the granting of most favored nation treat-
ment to the Soviet Union upon its agreement to permit emigration of those who wished
to leave, constituted interference with its domestic jurisdiction. See TME, Oct. 1, 1973,
at 23; New York Times, Oct. 17, 1973, at 18, col. 7. States are, of course, free to nego-
tiate and enter into agreements concerning whatever they consider beneficial to regulate
by such agreements. Moreover, the Soviet Union had already ratified the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, see 10 U.N. Mo. CHRON. 86 (Nov. 1973), and the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signa-
ture March 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, both of which provide for freedom of emigration.
Thus, the argument that the inclusion of a similar provision in a treaty between the
United States and the Soviet Union constituted an intrusion into the latter's domestic
jurisdiction was doubly fallacious.
191. U.N. CHARTER art. 2. The paragraph continues: "[Blut this principle shall not
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." Id. Thus the
United States in fact ratified a treaty that specifically permits intervention in domestic
affairs under certain circumstances. However, such intervention is not possible insofar
as the United States is concerned, since enforcement measures under Chapter VII are
subject to the veto power,
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domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined
by the United States of America; . . .192
Without the "as determined by the United States" clause, this limitation
might properly be interpreted to mean that the International Court of
Justice would only have jurisdiction over disputes involving matters that
were regulated by customary international law or by treaties to which
the United States was a party. The effect of the "as determined by
the United States" clause is to permit the United States to appear to
accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice,
while in fact reserving to itself the right to determine whether it wished
to submit to such jurisdiction with respect to any specific dispute.
19 3
It has no bearing, however, on the matters to which the United States
could constitutionally bind itself by treaty.19 4  Thus, whether a Missouri
citizen could shoot birds in Missouri was a matter within the domestic
jurisdiction of the United States prior to the treaty with Canada. This,
however, neither precluded United States ratification of a treaty on the
subject nor the affirmation of its constitutionality by the United States
Supreme Court.'95
Professor Henkin suggests that the confusion may be due to a cir-
cular promulgated by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles "apar-
ently in an effort to console the Bricker forces after the defeat of their
effort to amend the Constitution."''9 0 The circular, directed to the
State Department, provided:
Treaties should be designed to promote United States interests by secur-
ing action by foreign governments in a way deemed advantageous to the
United States. Treaties are not to be used as a device for the pur-
poses of affecting internal social changes or to try to circumvent the
constitutional procedures established in relation to what are essentially
matters of domestic concern.' 97
Henkin points out that the circular announced policy, not constitutional
doctrine, and that "[i]ndeed, it was probably designed to impose as
192. 61 Stat. 1218 (1946), T.I.A.S. No. 1598.
193. For a discussion and analysis of the Connally Amendment, see Briggs, Towards
the Rule of Law?, 51 Am. J. Itr'L L. 517 (1957); McClure, World Rule of Law: The
Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 1960 DUKE L.J. 56; Preuss, Questions
Resulting From the Connally Amendment, 32 A.B.A.J. 660 (1946).
194. See L. HENmIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTrrrTrON 140-56 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as HENKIw].
195. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), discussed in text at notes 202-05
infra.
196. HENKmN, supra note 194, at 402-03 n.89,
197. 1d,
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policy what the Bricker Amendment would have imposed as constitu-
tional law, but which . . .was not the law of the Constitution un-
amended."'
1 0 8
B. The States' Rights Argument
Another argument which has been made against United States ratifi-
cation of human rights conventions, and which would no doubt be made
against United States ratification of conventions on women's rights to
the extent the subject matter is not covered by federal statutes, is that
ratification would improperly subject to federal regulation matters con-
stitutionally within the reserved powers of the states. 99 Even if "states'
rights" were a limitation on the treaty power, it is doubtful whether
United States participation in the conventions providing equality for
women would thus be precluded since the subject matter is already gov-
erned by federal law to a large extent.200 Indeed, the extent to which
these matters are already regulated by federal law indicates the broad
expansion of federal power and the validity of Henkin's assertion that
"there is practically nothing that is dealt with by treaty that could not
also be the subject of legislation by Congress."'20 '
Whatever the division of power between the states and federal gov-
ernment domestically, however, it is clear that states rights do not con-
stitute a limitation on the scope of the treaty power. That was estab-
lished by the Supreme Court decision in Missouri v. Holland,
202
wherein the Court rejected a challenge to the validity of a federal stat-
ute implementing a treaty with Canada which regulated the hunting of
migratory birds, even though an earlier Act of Congress which regu-
198. Henkin, The Constitution, Treaties and International Human Rights, 116 U. PA.
L. REv. 1012, 1028-29 (1968) [hereinafter cited as The Constitution].
199. Senator Sam Ervin made reference to this argument in his statement before a
Senate subcommittee. See Hearings on Executive 0, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., Concerning
The Convention on the Prevention aqd Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Before
a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., (1971),
in GENocmE CONVENTION (1971).
200. Federal statutes already bar discrimination in several areas: employment, Equal
Employment Opportunities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1970); remuneration, Equal Pay
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970); and education, Equal Educational Opportunities and
Transportation of Students Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. IV, 1974). The extent to
which the United States law presently accords the rights provided for by international
conventions is discussed in text at notes 254-420 infra.
201. The Constitution, supra note 198, at 1017. See also Henkin,. The Treaty Makers
and the Lmv Makers: The Law of the Land and Foreign Relations, 107 U. P. -L. REv.
903 (1959).
202. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).. ............. ..
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lated the same matter in the absence of a treaty had been ruled uncon-
stitutional by lower federal courts."' Justice Holmes, writing for a
majority of the Court stated:
It is said that there are limits . . . to the treaty-making power, and
that one such limit is that what an act of Congress could not do unaided,
in derogation of the powers reserved to the States, a treaty cannot do.
20 4
The Court later noted:
Valid treaties of course "are as binding within the territorial limits of
the States as they are elsewhere throughout the dominion of the United
States." . . . No doubt the great body of private relations usually fall
within the control of the State, but a treaty may override its power.2 0,5
It is a matter of history that attempts to reverse that position by con-
stitutional amendment have failed.200
Henkin views the treaty clause itself as a delegation of power to the
federal government. He states:
The Constitution delegated powers to various branches of the federal
government, not only to Congress; the Treaty Power was a delegation
to the federal treaty-makers in addition to and independent of the dele-
gations to Congress. Since the Treaty Power was delegated to the
federal government, whatever was within it was not reserved to the states
by the Tenth Amendment. Many matters, then, may be "reserved to
the States" as regards domestic legislation but not as regards interna-
tional agreement. They are, one might say, left to the States subject to
defeasance if the United States should decide to make a treaty about
them.
2 07
203. United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914), appeal dismissed, 248
U.S. 594 (1919); United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288 (D. Kan. 1915).
204. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
205. Id. at 434 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
206. The so-called Bricker Amendment would have provided that "[a] treaty shall be-
come effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation which would
be valid in the absence of treaty." SJ. Res. 1, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 CONG. RFeC.
6777 (1953). Repeated and extensive hearings were held on the proposed amendment.
See Hearings on S.I. Res. 130 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
82d Cong., 2d Sess., (1952), in TREAnEs D EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS (1952); Hear-
ings on SI. Res. 1 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong.,
1st Sess., (1953), in "IEATms AND ExEcurivE AGREEMENTS (1953); Hearings on S.I.
Res. 1 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.,
(1955), in TREATES AND ExictrrvE AGREEMENTS (1955). For a list of articles discuss-
ing the amendment, see W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 112 n.39 (3d ed. 1971). As
the scope of federal power is expanded, the significance of this amendment, even if it
had passed, is diminished. HENmr, supra note 194, at 147; The Constitution, supra note
198, at 1018.
207. HENKrN, supra note 194, at 146.
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Like other powers, the treaty power is, of course, subject to the guaran-
tees provided for by the Bill of Rights.20 s
State laws regulating inheritance, 20 repayment of debts,210 local
taxes,21' conduct of various businesses, 212 ownership of land,21 3 dis-
bursement of assets of an insurance company, 214 hunting of birds,21
all properly the subject of state regulation and not subject to federal
regulation in the absence of a treaty, have been held superseded by trea-
ties from the earliest days of United States history. Thus, in Ware v.
Hylton,21 6 the Supreme Court invalidated a decree of the Virginia
courts, based on that state's laws on repayment of debts, on the ground
that it was contrary to a provision in a treaty between the United States
and Britain. Most recently, the Supreme Court invoked the federal
foreign affairs power to invalidate state laws dealing with inheritance
of property within the state.217 The decision in Zschernig was not based
on an inconsistent treaty. Rather, the Court reasoned that since inheri-
tance by foreigners affects our foreign relations, the state was pre-
empted from regulating the matter even though the property to be in-
herited was in the state.218 If states cannot regulate property or activity
within the state, even in the absence of a treaty, because of the effect
the attempted regulation may have on foreign affairs, then a fortiori the
United States cannot be precluded from ratifying treaties on matters
that affect the conduct of United States foreign affairs merely because
the matter would otherwise be subject to state rather than federal
regulation.210
208. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957).
209. Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879).
210. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
211. Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929).
212. See, e.g., Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924); cf. Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
213. Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. 211 (1872).
214. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
215. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
216. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
217. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). See also Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971), wherein the Supreme Court invalidated a state law denying welfare
benefits to aliens. While the decision was based on the equal protection clause, the Court
discussed at some length the power of the federal government with respect to aliens and
"the area of federal-state relations" as "[a]n additional reason why the state statutes
[did] not withstand constitutional scrutiny." 403 U.S. at 376.
218. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968).
219. Those who oppose United States ratification of treaties dealing with human
rights argue that in the earlier treaties the person seeking to own land, conduct a busi-
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In United States v. Pink,22° the Supreme Court upheld an executive
agreement between the United States and Russia in which Russia as-
signed to the United States its claim to assets of a Russian insurance
company located in New York. 21 The Court ruled that since this
agreement involved the conduct of foreign affairs, federal policy must
supersede state policy. 222 Thus the Court extended the supremacy
doctrine, which had heretofore been applied only to treaties, to execu-
tive agreements as well, notwithstanding that the matter would, in the
absence of foreign affairs considerations, be subject to state, rather
than federal, regulation. 2 3
However, some members of the State Department apparently still
labor under the mistaken notion that the United States cannot constitu-
ness, inherit property, or practice law in the United States was a citizen of a foreign
country, whereas the provisions of the human rights treaties accord rights to the citizens
of the United States. The basis of this line of argument, however, cannot be that the
federal government cannot enter into treaties on matters involving the reserved powers
of the states, since these treaties involve such powers. Rather the underlying premise
is that, to be the proper subject of a treaty, the matter must validly be of concern to
other countries; the unstated assumption is that how we treat another country's citizens is
properly the concern of other countries, but how we treat our own citizens is not. This,
of course, is the "international concern" argument which is discussed below. See notes
225-53 infra and accompanying text. The proposition that a country's treatment of its
own citizens is not a matter of international concern is belied by the numerous human
rights resolution passed by the United Nations and by the many human rights covenants
ratified by a significant number of countries. That human rights are properly a matter of
international concern was most recently reaffirmed by the United States Secretary of State
in his address to the opening session of the United Nations. See Speech by Secretary
of State Henry A. Kissinger before the Thirtieth Session of the United Nations General
Assembly, in Dept. of State, Sept. 22, 1975. See also Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, signed at Helsinki Aug. 1, 1975, reprinted in DEPT.
oF STATE BULL., Sept. 1, 1975, at 323.
220. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
221. The Court's ruling reversed the decision of the New York Court of Appeals, 284
N.Y. 555, 32 N.E.2d 552 (1940), which had earlier denied the claim on the grounds that
the Russian decree confiscating the assets was against the public policy of New York.
315 U.S. at 231-33.
222. Id. at 230-31.
223. A puzzling aspect of the case, which the opinion did not address, is how the
Soviet Union had a claim to assign under federal law. Under the Act of State doctrine
as applied, see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964),
United States' courts will enforce the act of a foreign state with respect to prop-
erty that was located in that state at the time the decree was issued. This enforcement
will occur even if contrary to international law or the .United States Constitution. The
property in question in Pink, however, insofar as .appears from the case,, was located in
New York when the Soviet decree was issued. Therefore, even under federal law, Russia
would not be entitled to it and. would .therefore have nothing .to assign to the. United
States. "
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tionally enter into treaties on matters which would be subject to state
law in the absence of a treaty. Notwithstanding the decision of the
Supreme Court in Missouri v. Holland that the reserved rights of the
states are not a limitation on the treaty power, a representative of the
State Department advised a congressional committee that the United
States could not constitutionally enter into a treaty modeled on the Dec-
laration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women because,
[t]he federal government cannot, under the Constitution, undertake an
international legal obligation to legislate matters that fall within the
jurisdiction of the states such as the acquisition, administration and
disposition of property during marriage, or the rights and duties in
matters relating to children or the establishment of minimum age for
marriage.
224
Whether the United States should enter into such treaties is open
to political debate but that ratification is not constitutionally precluded
by a "states' rights" argument would seem well established since Missouri
v. Holland. As long as misconceptions about the legality of participa-
tion persist in the State Department, however, it may continue to advise
against consideration and ratification of various treaties on women's
rights and human rights, in general, in the erroneous belief that the
United States lacks constitutional authority to ratify them.
C. International Concern
The main thrust of the American Bar Association report225 opposing
United States ratification of the Convention on the Political Rights of
Women and of Mr. Deutsch's testimony before the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee 2 6 was that the subject matter of the convention is not
of international concern. While there is nothing in the language of the
Constitution itself limiting the treaty power to matters of "international
concern," reference to such a requirement may be found in the writings
of Jefferson, 227 in a number of Supreme Court decisions, 228 and in an
oft-quoted statement by Charles Evans Hughes. 2 9
224. Hearings on the Int'l Protection of Human Rights: The Work of Int'l Organiza-
tions and the Role of United States Foreign Policy Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Or-
ganizations and Movements of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., 837 (1973) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
225. See notes 183-84 supra and accompanying text.
226. See note 186 supra and accompanying text.
227. See notes 230-31 infra and accompanying text.
228. See note 235 infra.
229. See text accompanying note 240 infra.
34 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10
In his Manual of Parliamentary Practice, 0' Thomas Jefferson noted
several reservations on the treaty-making power:
To what subjects this power extends, has not been defined in detail by
the Constitution, nor are we entirely agreed among ourselves. (1) It
is admitted that it must concern the foreign nation, party to the contract,
or it would be a mere nullity, res inter alios acta. (2) By the general
power to make treaties, the Constitution must have intended to compre-
hend only those subjects which are usually regulated by treaty, and can-
not be otherwise regulated. (3) It must have meant to except out of
these the rights reserved to the states; for surely the President and Senate
cannot do by treaty what the whole government is interdicted from doing
in any way. (4) And also to except those subjects of legislation in
which it gave a participation to the House of Representatives. This
last exception is denied by some, on the ground that it would leave very
little matter for the treaty power to work on. The less the better, say
others.
231
With respect to the last two limitations-rights reserved to the states and
matters in which the House of Representatives can participate-Jeffer-
son proved to be clearly wrong. As already discussed, the contention
that treaties cannot be entered into on matters that are otherwise within
the reserved powers of the state was rejected by the Supreme Court
32
and the proposition that treaties cannot be entered into on matters
concerning which the House would otherwise have a voice is contradicted
by long established practice.233 Indeed, if both these limitations applied,
it would seem that no treaties creating domestic law would be valid.
Since the federal legislative power is vested in Congress every treaty
creating domestic law must by definition involve either the enumerated
230. T. JEFFERSON, MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE 110 (1876), quoted in 5
J. MooRn, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 162 (1906).
231. Id. at 162.
232. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). See discussion in text accompanying
notes 202-05 supra.
233. See, e.g., Agreement to Facilitate Inventory of Patent Rights and Technical In-
formation for Defense Purposes, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 799, T.I.A.S. No. 3226 (defense); Con-
vention with Norway for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Estates and Inheritances, [1951] 2 U.S.T. 2353,
T.T.A.S. No. 2358 (taxation); Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with
Ireland, [1950] 1 U.S.T. 785, T.I.A.S. No. 2155 (trade and commerce); Convention with
Sweden for the Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors, [1924] 43 Stat. 1830,
T.S. 698 (smuggling). See also HENEIN, supra note 194, at 149.
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powers of Congress, which includes participation by the House of Repre-
sentatives, or the reserved rights of the states.2"4 Yet, such a limitation
cannot have been the intent of those who drafted the Constitution or
there would be no need for the supremacy clause.
Jefferson's position that the treaty must "concern the foreign nation,"
variously stated as, must "involve our foreign relations," must be "the
proper subject of negotiation between states," or must be of "interna.
tional concern," has found continuous support in decisions of the Su-
preme Court,233 in lower court decisions,236 in statements and writing%
234. There have been some agreements involving the exercise of independent execu-
tive power which have domestic effect. See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324 (1937), and United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), discussed at notes 220-23
supra and accompanying text. In these cases the Supreme Court sustained executive
agreements involving settlement of claims with the Soviet Union and superseding con-
trary New York law, based on the constitutional power of the executive to appoint and
receive ambassadors. It would seem, however, that had Congress sought to legislate on
the matter, it could have done so under its power to regulate foreign commerce. There-
fore, this agreement, too, would have been invalid as a treaty under Jefferson's provision
that matters on which the House has a voice cannot be the subject of a treaty. While
there is an area where executive and legislative powers overlap and where the executive
is free to act in the absence of contrary congressional action, cf. Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), it is unclear what, if any, authority the execu-
tive has in areas in which congressional authority does not overlap. I know of no execu-
tive agreement having domestic effect which has been sustained by the courts in the face
of an express act by Congress to the contrary. But see Statement of Monroe Leigh,
Legal Advisor to the State Department, before the Subcommittee on Separations of Pow-
ers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, May 13, 1975, DEPT. OF STATE BuLL., June
16, 1975, at 831:
[I]f there is one issue upon which all observers agree, it would be recognition
of the President's authority to conclude certain executive agreements, even if within
a narrow category, under the powers granted him by the Constitution and without
congressional interference or limitation.
Id. Possibly, Leigh was referring to agreements that do not have domestic effect, such
as those regarding the number and credentials of diplomatic personnel.
235. Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931) ("all subjects that properly per-
tain to our foreign relations"); Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) ("all proper
subjects of negotiation between our government and other nations"); Geofroy v. Riggs,
133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) ("any matter which is properly the subject of negotiation with
a foreign country"); Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. 211, 243 (1872) ("all those objects
which in the intercourse of nations had usually been regarded as the proper subjects of
negotiation and treaty"). It should be noted that the Supreme Court has never invali-
dated a treaty on the grounds that it dealt with a matter that was not of international
concern. But, in Power Authority v. Federal Power Comm'n, 247 F.2d 538 (D.C.
Cir. 1957), a federal circuit court invalidated a reservation inserted by the Senate into
a treaty between the United States and Canada on the allocation of Niagara waters on
the grounds that the reservation was not a matter of international concern.
236. See, e.g., Power Authority v. Federal Power Comm'n, 247 F.2d 538, 542 (D.C.
Cir. 1957); United States v. Samples, 258 F. 479, 482 (W.D. Mo. 1919).
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of statesmen and scholars,23 7 and in the Restatement of the Foreign Re-
lations Law of the United States.238
One of the most frequently cited statements in support of that posi-
tion is an extemporaneous comment made by Charles Evans Hughes.
At a meeting of the American Society of International Law he noted
.that the treaty power
is intended for the purpose of having treaties made relating to foreign
affairs and not to make laws for the people of the United States in
* their internal concerns through the exercise of the asserted treaty-
making power.
23 9
He appears to divide treaties into two categories: those relating to "for-
eign affairs" or "matters of international concern,' 240 and those which
involve laws "for the people of the United States in their internal con-
terns. ' '241 The two are not mutually exclusive, however.
At least in our times, a matter may involve laws regulating the inter-
nal affairs of the people of a country, yet have very significant effects
on its foreign relations. South Africa's and Rhodesia's treatment of its
black citizens and the Soviet Union's treatment of its Jewish citizens,
particularly those who seek to emigrate, are but two of the most striking
examples of situations in which a state's treatment of its own citizens has
aroused great international concern and may have considerable inter-
national consequences. On numerous occasions, the United Nations and
its organs have discussed and passed resolutions involving a state's
internal treatment of its citizens.242 Thus, the dichotomy postulated fails
to take note of a third category: treaties that involve a state's treatment
of its own citizens in matters that are of substantial international con-
cern. It is into this category that most of the human rights cov-
enants fall. Was Hughes saying that the United States could not enter
into a treaty relating to the external affairs of the United States which
also involved its internal concerns, or did he mean only that the United
States could not enter into treaties involving the internal concerns of
237. See, e.g., Lissitzyn, The Law of International Agreements in the Restatement,
'41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 96, 113-24 (1966); Whitton & Fowler, Bricker Amendmnent-Fal-
lacies and Dangers, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 23, 51-56 (1954).
238. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 117(1) (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
239. 23 PROC. AM. SoC'y INT'L L. 196 (1929) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS].
240. According to Hughes, these areas are the proper subject of treaties. Id.
241. Id.
242. For examples of General Assembly resolutions condemning certain activities of
South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal, see 26 U.N. YEARB ooK 103, 133, 599-601 (1972);
24 U.N. YEARBOOK 519 (1970).
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the United States which did not affect external concerns as well? Since
he does not deal explicitly with the latter type of treaty, it cannot be
said definitively what Hughes' position would be. It is at least arguable
from other parts of the statement, however, that he meant to exclude
from the treaty power only those matters which have no relation to our
foreign affairs and did not intend to exclude those that affect United
States citizens in their internal concerns as well as the foreign relations
of the United States. Thus he said,
[i]t seems to me that, whatever doubt there may originally have been or
may yet linger in some minds in regard to the scope of the treaty-mak-
ing power, so far as it relates to the external concerns of the nation
there is no question for discussion. 24
3
[FIrom my point of view the nation has the power to make any agree-
ment whatever in a constitutional manner that relates to the conduct
of our international relations, unless there can be found some express
prohibition in the Constitution .... 244
The clear implication is that only "if we attempted to use the treaty-
making power to deal with matters which did not pertain to our exter-
nal relations," then "there might be ground for implying a limitation
upon the treaty-making power ... . Conversely, if the treaty deals
with a matter that does effect our external relations, there is no limita-
tion on the treaty power. Certainly, the United States has ratified many
treaties affecting our relations with other countries that also affect our
internal affairs.246
The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
similarly provides that:
The United States has the power under the Constitution to make an
international agreement if
(a) the matter is of international concern .... 247
A comment adds:
Matters of international concern are not confined to matters exclusively
concerned with foreign relations. Usually, matters of international con-
cern have both international and domestic effects, and the existence of
the latter does not remove a matter from international concern.2
5
243. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 239, at 194.
244. Id. at 196.
245. Id.
246. See notes 209-18 supra and accompanying text.
247. RESTATEMENT, supra note 238, § 117(1).
248. Id. § 117, comment b. Hughes' statement also seems to indicate concern lest the
treaty power be used by the federal government to regulate matters otherwise subject
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One of the fallacies of the arguments of those who oppose United
States ratification of human rights conventions is the failure to recog-
nize that a matter can be both of domestic concern and of international
concern, i.e., that the two are not mutually exclusive.2 49  For example,
determining who can vote in a state is a matter of great domestic con-
cern. Indeed, all human rights are or should be a matter of utmost
domestic concern since the fundamental rights of the states' citizens are
involved. But they are also a matter of international concern.
With the exception of Mr. Deutsch, dll the witnesses who ap-
peared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and before its
subcommittee representing a number of organizations comprising sub-
stantial numbers of United States citizens, urged United States ratifi-
cation of the Convention on the Political Rights of Women. They did
so not to effect United States law, since the rights provided therein are
already guaranteed by the nineteenth amendment to the Constitution,
only to state regulation. Thus he states: "But if we attempted to use the treaty-making
power to deal with matters . . . which normally and appropriately were within the local
jurisdictions of the States .... ".PROCEEDINGS, supra note 239, at 196 (emphasis
added).
That states' rights are not a limitation on the treaty power is discussed at notes 199-
224 supra and accompanying text. Even if the argument were viable, however, it would
not bar United States ratification of the Convention on the Political Rights of Women,
the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the Convention Concerning Equal
Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value, and the Conven-
tion Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, since the
-subject matter of these conventions is already regulated by federal law in the absence of
treaty: the first by the Constitution and the other three by statute.
249. Mr. Deutsch, testifying in opposition to United States ratification of the Conven-
tion on the Political Rights of Women, stated:
[I]f there is one thing, one concept which belongs within the domestic jurisdiction
of a country it is the right to fix the qualification of its voters. Whether women
should have the right to vote is certainly not a matter of international concern ....
Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 179, at 31. In support of this position, Mr. Deutsch
cited John Foster Dulles who had testified before the Senate in 1953 on the so-called
"Bricker Amendment":
I do not believe that treaties should, or lawfully can, be used as a device to circum-
vent the constitutional procedures established in relation to what are essentially
matters of domestic concern.
Id. at 33, quoting, Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 825 (1952), in TREATIES AND ExEcunvE AGREEMENTS
(1953). Dulles commented further:
This administration does not intend to sign the Convention on Political Rights of
Women . . . because we do not believe that this goal can be achieved by treaty
or that it constitutes a proper field for exercise of the treaty-making power.
Id. at 39, quoting, Hearings on S.J. Res. I Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 825 (1952), in TREATIES AND EXECUTIvE AGREEMENTS
(1953).
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but because they believe our action in this matter has a significant
effect internationally.2 50
250. Thus, Arthur Goldberg, United States representative to the United Nations at
the time, testified before the subcommittee:
I said at the outset that these treaties were important for the foreign policy of the
United States. I say that because it is my profound conviction that whatever the
views of experts may be or anybody may be upon the limitations and exercise of
American power, we stand for something in the world....
I would regard the signature on ratification of conventions which draw their inspira-
tion from our Constitution to be an important exercise of the foreign policy of the
United States. And I can say to you that our dedication to these ideals is one of
the great armories that a representative of the United States in the world commu-
nity carries with him!
Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 179, at 29-30. Goldberg continued:
Human rights is the great concern of the member states of the United Nations, and
they have changed dramatically since Secretary Dulles filed his statement. 'Great
Concern' is our own attitude toward human rights. It enters very profoundly in
our foreign policy.
Id. at 40.
On the subject of human rights, Rita Hauser, former United States representative to
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, in hearings before the Subcommittee
on International Organizations and Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs, stated:
[A]s a student of history, I find it very difficult to understand how one can ignore
the human rights aspect. At least since World War II, it is the underlying element
of most of the serious conflicts in the world that have given rise to both threats
to the peace and actual breach of the peace ...
I think the aspect of human rights problems in the conduct of our foreign policy
is central.
House Hearings, supra note 224, at 232.
Professor Richard Gardner, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Interna-
tional Organization Affairs, who appeared on behalf of a group of fifty-one organiza-
tions, was emphatic that the subject matter of these treaties is of international concern.
He stated:
I think most legal scholars would say that the treaty power is broad enough to en-
compass all matters of international concern as determined by contemporary fact
rather than by conceptions of a distant past, and this is really the central point I
wish to leave with the committee today, and, measured by standards of contempo-
rary fact, the matters dealt with in those three conventions are clearly matters of
international concern which justify use of the treaty making power.
Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 179, at 111.
With reference to the rights of women, Gardner said:
Mhe denial of basic rights to women . . . are a major source of social tension
and an obstacle to economic development in countries in which the United States
has an important interest.
Id.
Mr. Morris Abrams, then United States representative on the United Nations Commis-
sion on Human Rights, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
I believe, also, that the Political Rights of Women Convention meets the test both
of constitutionality and national interest-in that it is both an important objective
of our foreign relations and a matter of genuine international concern. Clearly,
genuine economic and social progress is difficult of attainment, especially in the de-
veloping countries-to which we send quantities of aid-if half the population is
deprived of status and dignity, of the right to vote and to hold public office. More-
over, as pointed out by one witness before the Subcommittee, the withholding from
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10
As a country which long ago enshrined human rights in its Constitu-
tion, the United States should continue to play a leadership role in this
area. The failure to ratify human rights conventions deprives the
United States of the affirmative effect such ratification would have
on foreign relations and also has a negative effect on the United States
position in the international community.
25'
The rights covered in the various covenants on women's and human
rights have been discussed repeatedly by the United Nations General
women of civil and political rights, the regarding of them as household possessions,
is an obstacle to the progress of family planning-a crucial means for defusing the
population explosion, which is perhaps the most critical problem that faces mankind
today.
Id. at 117-18.
251. Quoting Mr. Abrams again:
I would like to take as my text the following remarks directed to me by the Soviet
Delegate in the course of the Commission's Spring 1966 Session. With your per-
mission I shall read an excerpt from the Summary Record of that session:
"Mr. Morozov (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that, having listened
carefully to. . . the United States representative on 25 March and having heard
him warmly support. . . the creation of a post of United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights, he was obliged to point out that once again the Com-
mission was witnessing an attempt by the United States to divert it from its basic
task, which was to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Once again, instead of being encouraged. . . to draw up conventions and instru-
ments in the sphere of human rights with supervisory' machinery to ensure their
implementation, the Commission had before it a proposal so nebulous that even
those who supported it were unable to speak clearly on the subject.
"An objective analysis of the political orientation of the proposal so ardently
supported by the United States and its allies soon revealed that the proposal was
designed to give world public opinion the impression of active participation in
the cause of human rights by states which in practice obstinately refused to fulfill
their obligations under the multilateral international conventions in the field of
human rights drawn up under the auspices of the United Nations and its spe-
cialized agencies.
"It was clear from the facts he had just mentioned that the United States, wish-
ing to escape from the untenable position into which it had been forced by its
refusal to ratify the conventions in question, had thought that it could confuse
the issue by strongly supporting the creation of the post of United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights." U.N. Doc. E/C.4/SR. 879, at 9-10.
Id. at 119-20 (emphasis added).
John Carey, appearing on behalf of the Committee on International Law of the Asso-
ciation of the Bar of the City of New York, stated:
The purpose of the Conventions is to achieve common international standards on
matters of concern to the international community. These Conventions deal with
subjects which in our times are of "international concern," subjects which presently
"in the ordinary intercourse of nations had usually been made subjects of negotia-
tions and treaty." Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540, 569 (1840). The Conventions,
moreover, have real relation to the foreign affairs of the United States. Slavery
and forced labor elsewhere have clear economic implications for United States in-
dustry competing on the world market. Slavery and forced labor, and other major
violations of human rights, have major explosive tendencies which can threaten in-
ternational peace and security. Even the status of women, while-like slavery or
forced labor-no problem in the United States is a subject of agitation elsewhere
and one on which the members of the United Nations have called for international
cooperation to achieve a common minimum standard.
Id. at 202.
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Assembly, by other organs and committees of the United Nations, and
by other international organizations. Those rights have been the
subject of a universal declaration and of numerous resolutions voted
for by large numbers of states, ultimately resulting in treaties which
have been ratified by many states. Surely it cannot be argued that
treaties which have been ratified by fifty, sixty, seventy, or eighty
states of the world cannot, constitutionally, be entered into by the
United States because their subject matter is not of international concern.
A committee of lawyers, requested by the President's Commission for
the Observance of Human Rights Year to study the constitutionality of
United States ratification of human rights treaties, which was chaired
by Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark and which included several
past presidents of the American Bar Association as well as the then
president of the American Bar Association, concluded that such treaties
are a proper exercise of the treaty-making power.2 52 In his letter of
transmittal of the report, Justice Clark stated:
I would like to reiterate here, however, our finding, after a thorough
review of judicial, congressional, and diplomatic precedents, that humans
are matters of international concern and that the President, with the
U.S. Senate concurring, may, on behalf of the United States under the
treaty power of the Constitution ratify or adhere to any human rights
convention that does not contravene a specific constitutional prohibi-
tion .... 253
IV. POSSIBLE IMPACT OF RATIFICATION ON
EXISTING UNITED STATES LAW
Until recently, very little legislation existed in the United States with
respect to equality of the sexes. However, in the past several decades
significant federal and state legislation has emerged. In addition, the
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution has been
utilized successfully to eradicate some aspects of sex-based discrimina-
tion under the law. This section will explore the legal status of women
in the following areas: (1) political rights, (2) employment and eco-
nomic security, (3) marriage and the family, and (4) education. Ex-
isting United States law will then be compared to provisions of the in-
ternational conventions providing rights for women.
. Q
252. REPORT OF SPECIAL COMM. OF LAWYERS OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE
OBSERVANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS YEAR 1968, reprinted in House Hearings, supra note
224, Appendix 18, at 731.
253. Id. at 339-40.
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A. Political Rights
1. Historical Background
Although many of the rights enumerated in the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights are explicitly contained or implicitly
recognized in the Bill of Rights, the Constitution, unlike the inter-
national agreements, presently contains no textual commitment to
equality of the sexes. In 1791, it was understood that the individual
states could and almost universally did limit certain political rights such
as voting to white, male property owners. 2  Holding office and jury
service were public functions which were likewise restricted to the male
propertied class. 255 This was true despite the fact that before the
American Revolution some of the colonies had allowed women to vote
in local elections and in some instances to serve on juries.256
While isolated voices were raised to protest this contraction of rights
following the American Revolution, 25 7 it was not until the 1840's that
women in the United States initiated an organized effort for greater
political, legal and social rights.25 During the Civil War era, however,
these efforts were subordinated to the goal of achieving equality for
blacks. After the Civil War, women, who had fought for equality for
the newly-freed slaves, believed and expected that they would be re-
warded by expansion of their own legal and social rights. At the very
least, they expected to receive the right to vote. 259  However, the four-
teenth amendment, adopted in 1868, did not explicitly guarantee equal
treatment for women. Rather it provided: "nor shall any State de-
prive any person of. . .the equal protection of the laws. 20 ° The sec-
ond part of the fourteenth amendment provided for a reduction in rep-
254. K. PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 1-19 (2d ed. 1969).
See, e.g., E. TURNER, Women's Suffrage in New Jersey, 1790-1807, in 1 SMITH
COLLEGE STUDIES IN HISTORY 165 (1916); C. WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE:
FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY, 1760-1860, at 76-137 (1960). New Jersey is an
interesting exception to this general practice. In New Jersey women voted equally with
men between 1790 and 1807.
255. J. SPRUILL, WOMEN'S LIFE AND WORK IN THE SOUTHERN COLONIES 326-27 (2d
ed. 1970); J. WILSON, Illusion of Change: Women and the American Revolution
in THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: EXPLORATIONS IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN RADICAL-
IsM (A. Young ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as WsoN].
256. WILSON, supra note 255, at 417-18.
257. E. FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES 62-77 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as FLExNER].
258. Id. at 142-55, 164-78; W. O'NEILL, EVERYONE WAS BRAVE: A HISTORY OF
FEMINISM IN AMERICA 9-29 (1971) [hereinafter cited as O'NEILL].
259. A.F. ScoTT & A.M. SCOTT, ONE HALF THE PEOPLE: THE FIGHT FOR WOMAN
SUFFRAGE 14-16 (1975).
260. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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resentation if a state denied the vote to male citizens. Indeed, the
fourteenth amendment marks the first instance in which the term male
was inserted into the Constitution.
Furthermore, in interpreting the fourteenth amendment, the Su-
preme Court rejected attempts to utilize provisions of the amendment
to achieve increased legal and political rights for women. In one of
the earliest Supreme Court decisions arising under the fourteenth
amendment, the Court held that admission to the bar was not among
the privileges and immunities of citizenship and hence that the state
could exclude women from the practice of law. 6' Subsequently, in
response to the challenge of a St. Louis woman, the United States Su-
preme Court in Minor v. Happersett26 2 upheld the right of the states
to limit suffrage to males. The argument had been made that under
the fourteenth amendment, a woman who is a citizen of the United
States could not be denied the right to vote. The Supreme Court held
that voting was not among the privileges and immunities guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment. In the post Civil War period, divergent ele-
ments of the women's movement joined the common cause of securing
suffrage. 261 Persistent efforts at both state and national levels were con-
tinuous over the half century between the Civil War and World War
I. By 1919, thirty states had enfranchised women.264 This narrow-issue
campaign successfully culminated in 1920 with the passage of the nine-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution, which states:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
261. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). In a concurring opinion, Mr.
Justice Bradley stated:
mhe civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference
in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be,
woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy
which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of
civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the di-
vine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as
that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. The har-
mony, not to say identity, of interests and views which belong, or should belong,
to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct
and independent career from that of her husband.
Id. at 141.
262. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
263. FLEXNER, supra note 257, at 216-93; O'NEILL, supra note 258, at 49-76; A.
KRADIToR, THE IDEA OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, 1890-1920, at 1-11, 38-63,
210-23 (1971).
264. In chronological order the states to enfranchise women before the passage of the
nineteenth amendment were: Wyoming, Colorado, Idaho, Utah, Washington, Cali-
fornia, Oregon, Kansas, Arizona, lllinois, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Nebraska,
Rhode Island, New York, Arkansas, Michigan, Texas, South Dakota, Oklahoma, Indi-
ana, Maine, Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota, Ohio, Wisconsin, Tennessee and Kentucky. THE
NATIONAL WOMAN SUFFRAGE AssOCIATION, VICTORY, How WOMEN WON IT; A CENTEN-
NIAL SYMPOSIUM, 1840-1940, at 161-64, app. 4.
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abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex. 206
2. Convention on the Political Rights of Women
The Convention on the Political Rights of Women, a brief and nar-
rowly drawn agreement, requires that the opportunity to fully partici-
pate in public life be available on equal terms to all persons and
specifically provides that women be entitled to vote, run for and hold
office, and to exercise all public functions.2 0  The nineteenth amend-
ment is silent on the right to run for and hold elective and other public
offices. 267  However, it is clear that even absent a specific constitutional
provision similar in terms to the provision in the Convention on the Po-
litical Rights of Women, any infringement on the basis of sex of the
right to run for and hold public office would today be held violative
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The equal protection clause states: "No State shall . . . deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. ' 68  In recent years, the equal protection clause has been used
by the courts as a tool for implementing civil and political rights of such
traditionally disfavored groups as racial minorities, 20 9, aliens,270 and
illegitimates.217  These first two classifications have been held to be sus-
pect classifications and any legislation so drawn is subjected to the strict-
est judicial scrutiny.2 72 Until recently the Supreme Court has been reluc-
265. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
266. See text accompanying notes 58-65 supra.
267. Some early state courts held that the scope of rights encompassed in the nine-
teenth amendment was as broad as the rights encompassed in the fifteenth amendment.
Therefore, the right of women to vote included the right to run for and hold public of-
fice. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 113 A. 614 (1921), which held that:
When the ballot was conferred upon the colored race by the adoption of the Fif-
teenth Amendment, it is common knowledge that it was followed by the election
of persons of that race to office . ..and we are unable to find that their right
to hold office was ever questioned ....
Id. at 617. Preston v. Roberts, 110 S.E. 586 (1922), reached the same conclusion as
the Maine court. However, there was some confusion concerning the scope of the rights
contained in the nineteenth amendment. For example, see In re Opinion of the Justices,
139 A. 180 (1927), in which the court held that the nineteenth amendment could not
be extended to include rights not granted in the text of the amendment. In addition,
several states by legislation or constitutional amendment provided that women who
were qualified to vote were likewise qualified to hold any or certain specified public of-
fices. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-101 (1968); NEv. CONST. art. 15, § 3, which
provides that women may hold only the offices of superintendent of public instruction,
deputy superintendent of public instruction, school trustee, and notary public.
268. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
269. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1966).
270. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
271. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
272. In the traditional test, the court inquires into legislative permissibility of the law;
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tant to apply this strict scrutiny test to laws which classify on the basis
of sex.2 3 Indeed, in the past, a woman's right to serve on a jury had
been limited on the basis of sex in both federal274 and state2 75 courts.
whether the classification established by the legislature bears a reasonable relation to
the objective of the law and whether all persons similarly situated are similarly treated.
Under this standard, termed minimum scrutiny, very few state laws have been held vio-
lative of equal protection. See, e.g., Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Railway Ex-
press Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S.
464 (1948).
In two circumstances, however, the Court has required a much stricter test. These
cases are:
(1) When the classification is inherently suspect such as race, creed or alienage,
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944);
(2) When the legislation affects a fundamental interest such as voting, Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), or travel and interstate movement, Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
In these instances, it is not enough that the state prove that the classification is rea-
sonable, but rather the state must show a compelling interest for the classification. This
scrutiny has been termed strict scrutiny. For all practical purposes, this compelling state
interest is almost never found to be present by the court. See Tussman & tenBroek, The
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949); Note, 82 HARV. L. Rv.
1065 (1969).
273. In Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), the Supreme Court upheld a state
statute which provided that only daughters or wives of male bar owners could tend bar
despite a challenge based on the equal protection clause.
Justice Frankfurter lightly dismissed the contention that the statute was motivated by
the desire to restrict employment opportunities in bartending to males. He wrote:
Since the line they [legislators] have drawn is not without a basis in reason, we
cannot give ear to the suggestion that the real impulse behind this legislation was
an unchivalrous desire of male bartenders to try to monopolize the calling.
Id. at 467.
274. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 73, provided that qualifications and
exemptions of the state in which the federal court sat would prevail in the federal courts.
Although the Judiciary Act of 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, was intended to initiate uni-
form juror standards in the federal system, the act provided that a person was competent
to serve as a juror unless: "(4) He is incompetent to serve as a grand or petit juror by
the law of the State in which the district court is held." Judiciary Act of 1948, ch. 646,
§ 951, 62 Stat. 869. This provision was deleted from the Judiciary Act by the Civil
Rights Act of 1957, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1970). Note, 4 HOUSTON L. REv. 570, 570-71
(1966).
The qualifying provisions for federal jurors are contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1970)
which was enacted in 1948:
It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal courts entitled to
trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from
a fair cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the court
convenes. It is further the policy of the United States that all citizens shall have
the opportunity to be considered for service on grand and petit juries in the district
courts of the United States on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin
or economic status.
Id. See also Note, The Congress, The Court and Jury Selection: A Critique of Titles I
and H of The Civil Rights Bill of 1966, 52 VA. L. REv. 1069, 1076 n.43 (1966).
275. As of August 1, 1962, only twenty-one states permitted women to serve on juries
on the same basis as men. Three states prohibited service completely: Alabama, Mis-
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As late as 1961, the Supreme Court in Hoyt v. Florida2 70 unanimously
upheld a Florida statute which automatically exempted women from jury
duty unless they expressed an affirmative desire to serve. Speaking
for the Court, Mr. Justice Harlan stated:
Despite the enlightened emancipation of women from the restrictions
and protections of bygone years , . . . woman is still regarded as the
center of the home and family life.
277
It was not until 1971 in Reed v. Reed2 78 that the Supreme Court
invalidated legislation that classified on the basis of sex. Since 1971,
the position the Court has taken with respect to sex-based classifica-
tions can only be characterized as ambiguous. While it has invalidated
statutes which appeared to discriminate against women 279 or to discrim-
inate against men,2 0 it has sustained sex-based classifications that it
perceived to benefit women.281
The broadest statement of the Court concerning equality of the sexes
is contained in Frontiero v. Richardson.8 2 Justice Brennan's opinion,
announcing the judgment for the Court, stated that sex is a suspect
classification and discussed the adverse effects that a long history of
sex discrimination has had on women, concluding:
And what differentiates sex from such non-suspect statutes as intel-
ligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect
sissippi and South Carolina. L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAw: THE UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION 29 (1974) [hereinafter cited as KANowiTz].
276. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
277. Id. at 61-62.
278. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The female petitioner in Reed challenged an Idaho statute
which provided that when several persons are equally entitled to administer an estate,
males must be given preference over females. Chief Justice Burger wrote for the Court:
Clearly the objective of reducing the workload on probate courts by eliminating
one class of contests is not without some legitimacy. The crucial question, how-
ever, is whether § 15-314 advances that objective in a manner consistent with the
command of the Equal Protection Clause. We hold that it does not. To give a
mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely
to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind
of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment; and whatever may be said as to the positive values of avoiding
intrafamily controversy, the choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated
solely on the basis of sex.
Id. at 76-77.
279. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636
(1975). However, it is to be noted that Weinberger, which involved a federal statute,
was decided on the equal protection grounds inherent in the fifth amendment due
process clause. id. at 642-45.
280. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
281. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498
(1975).
282. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to
ability to perform or contribute to society. As a result, statutory dis-
tinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating
the entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the
actual capabilities of its individual members.
28 3
Significantly, five of the justices did not join the Court's opinion in
finding sex a suspect classification. Since Frontiero, the proposition
that sex is a suspect classification has not commanded a majority of the
Supreme Court.
The constitutional protection extended women against discrimination
on the basis of sex to date has been largely insufficient and the future
is unpredictable. Indeed, not only has the court failed to set a trend in
equal protection for women, but the entire development of the equal pro-
tection doctrine is in question. Recent opinions evidence a tendency to
experiment with new tests 84 for equal protection8 5 as well as a re-
newed interest in further development of the due process clause.280
Thus, the effectiveness of the equal protection clause to eradicate sex-
based discrimination is still uncertain.
However, with respect to an infringement on the right to run for an
elective office or to hold an appointive position, the equal protection
clause provides adequate protection for women. In the 1964 case of
Reynolds v. Sims, the Supreme Court stated:
283. Id. at 686-87.
284. For a discussion of traditional tests, see note 272 supra. As to new tests, emerg-
ing patterns include a careful review in cases where "mere rationality" is articulated as
the test. The Warren Court always upheld the challenged state action when the mere
rationality test had been used. However, in several cases including James v. Strange,
407 U.S. 128 (1972), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) and Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971), the challenged statutes were invalidated by the Burger Court using this
mere rationality test. Justice Marshall has urged the use of a "spectrum of standards
in reviewing discriminations allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause." San
Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, I., dissenting).
This so-called "sliding scale" analysis is urged and explained by Justice Marshall in sev-
eral opinions including United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508
(1973) (Marshall, J., concurring) and San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See G. GUNTHER & N. DoWLING, CONSTrru-
TIONAL LAW AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 219-22 (8th ed. Supp.
1974).
285. The Court has recently invalidated legislation, not on Equal Protection grounds,
but because the classification involved an "irrebutable presumption" offensive to due
process. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United States
Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S.
441 (1973).
286. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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[T]he fundamental principle of representative government in this coun-
try is one of equal representation for equal numbers of people, without
regard to race, sex, economic status, or place of residence within a
State.287
The Court further stated:
And the concept of equal protection has traditionally been viewed as
requiring the uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation
to the governmental action questioned or challenged.
288
In more recent cases the Court has invalidated restrictions on the
ability to run for elective office on equal protection principles.2"" Thus,
it is clear that any legislative attempt to exclude women from running
for office would be held violative of the equal protection clause.
Although the Convention on the Political Rights of Women does not
specifically provide for jury service by women, the rights to exercise
all public functions on equal terms with men, as set forth in the conven-
tion, might be construed to encompass the right to serve on juries. 00
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court in 1961 had held that the auto-
matic exemption of women from juries did not violate a woman's con-
stitutional rights. That holding was effectively overruled in 1975 in
Taylor v. Louisiana,0 1 which held that such a statute denied a male de-
fendant his sixth amendment right to trial by a jury composed of a
cross section of the community. Although the holding of the case was
not based on the right of women to serve on juries on equal terms with
men, the effect of the case is to invalidate all laws with respect to jury
service which classify on the basis of sex.
3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contains
broad provisions and guarantees with respect to equal treatment of men
and women under the law.292 It provides an unambiguous legal basis
for the elimination of discrimination based on sex and in this respect
it is similar in effect to the Equal Rights Amendment 93 to the United
287. Id. at 560-61.
288. Id. at 565.
289. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
290. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
291. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
292. See notes 7-30 supra and accompanying text.
293. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII, § 1 (proposed): "Equality of rights under the law
shal not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex."
The amendment was passed by Congress on March 22, 1972. By April, 1976,
34 states had ratified it: Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Da-
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States Constitution, now pending before the states. Absolute political
and civil equality for both sexes is mandated both by the proposed
amendment and by the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. While such equality is not today obligatory under state and
federal law, several states, including Alaska 2 94 California,295 Colo-
rado,290  Hawaii,2 97  Illinois,295  Maryland,299  Montana,30 0  Pennsyl-
vania,301 Texas,3 0 2 Virginia,30 3 and Washington,"°4 have passed equal
rights amendments to their Tespective state constitutions as a result
of the debate over the Equal Rights Amendment to the Federal Consti-
tution.
B. Employment and Economic Security
Significant federal and state legislation has been enacted in recent
years in the area of employment and employment-related benefits.
This section will briefly describe the federal legislation which has con-
tributed to an equalization between the sexes in this area; namely, the
Equal Pay Act,"05 Title VII of the Civil Rights Aot of 1964 (Title VII or
the Act) ,306 and the Old Age and Survivor's Insurance Act.307 In addi-
tion, it will compare this legislation with the international conventions
on these subjects.
1. The Equal Pay Act
Like the Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and
kota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Ver-
mont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. CAL. COMM'N ON THE
STATUS OF WOMEN, ERA RATIFICATION UPDATE (1976). Ratification by three-fourths
of the states is needed to amend the Constitution. For a comprehensive discus-
sion of the proposed amendment, see Brown, Emerson, Falk, & Freedman, The Equal
Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J.
871 (1970).
294. ALAS. CONST. art. I, § 3.
295. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
296. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 29.
297. HAwAnI CONST. art. I, § 4.
298. ILL. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2, 18.
299. MD. CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 46.
300. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
301. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 28.
302. TEx. CONST. art. 1, § 3a.
303. VA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
304. WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1.
305. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970). The Equal Pay Act is an amendment to the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1970), which provides for federal mini-
mum wage and overtime pay.
306. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. (Supp. 1974).
307. Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1970), as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (Supp. 1974).
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Women Workers for Work of Equal Value, 8  the Equal Pay Act of
1963309 requires equal pay for equal work regardless of the employee's
sex. Enacted by Congress as an amendment to the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act, °10 the Equal Pay Act was designed to meet the open and
widespread practice of paying women less than men for the same work.
It requires employers to pay equal salaries to a man and woman when
their jobs involve essentially the same duties and require substantially
equal skill, effort and responsibility and are done under similar working
conditions. 311 It also forbids labor unions "to cause or to attempt to
cause" an employer to violate this requirement.
31 2
As of 1974, over 600 suits had been brought under the Equal Pay
Act. Unlike Title VII, the Equal Pay Act covers all workers engaged
in interstate commerce but it concerns wages, not other terms of em-
ployment. Because of employment patterns and the Act's limited cov-
erage, it has a smaller impact than might be expected."' 3 However,
308. See notes 74-76 supra and accompanying text.
309. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970). The Equal Pay Act covers all employees subject
to section 6 of the Fair Labor Standards Act:
[E]mployees who in any work week [are] engaged in commerce or in the produc-
tion of goods for commerce, or [are] employed in an enterprise engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce ...
Id. § 206(a). Limited usefulness of the Act as a means to remedy discrimination
in employment stems from the fact that the Act covers only workers who are
employed, not those seeking employment, and applies only to wages, not to pensions
or other terms of employment.
As of 1975 the following states had enacted equal pay provisions similar to the fed-
eral Act: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Co-
lumbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Tbxas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
Labor Relations, Wages, Hours and Employment Regulation, No. 409, 1 BNA LAn. REL.
REP. 38 (Feb. 2, 1975).
310. 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1970).
311. Id. § 206(d)(1) (1970).
312. Id. § 206(d)(2) (1970). When the Senate passed this law, they were acting
with a specific goal in mind:
Congress' purpose in enacting the Equal Pay Act was to remedy what was per-
ceived to be a serious and endemic problem of employment discrimination in private
industry-the fact that the wage structure of 'many segments of American industry
has been based on an ancient but outmoded belief that a man, because of his role
in society, should be paid more than a woman even though his duties are the same.'
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974) (citation omitted).
313. TASK FORCE ON WORKING WOMEN, EXPLOrrATION FROM 9 TO 5: REPORT OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON WOMEN AND EMPLOYMENT 90 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT]. The reasons for the lack of effectiveness
are:
First, gaps in coverage mean that many women are not protected against sex-based
wage discrimination. Second, in industrial jobs, an important area of women's em-
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since the passage of Title VII, any violation of the Equal Pay Act
would also constitute a violation of Title VII. Thus an action under
the Equal Pay Act can be combined with an action under Title VII.314
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the most important and
comprehensive of all federal and state laws prohibiting employment
discrimination. Like the Discrimination Convention, 15 it prohibits dis-
crimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, national
origin or sex. 1"
The Act protects the rights of persons to obtain and hold a job, as
well as the right to equal treatment once the job has been obtained.
317
As amended in 1972, Title VII covers employers with fifteen or more
workers, but it excludes from coverage the United States government
ployment, positions are frequently sex segregated both by company and by job cate-
gories. Thus, women are often paid less because they are assigned to "women's"
jobs that pay less, rather than because they are paid less for the same work. When
both men and women do have the same occupation, it is still common for individual
establishments to employ only workers of the same sex in a given occupational cate-
gory.
Id.
314. To "discriminate against any individual with respect to his (sic) compensation
* . ." is a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See TASK FORCE RE-
PORT, supra note 313, at 278.
315. See notes 77-84 supra and accompanying text.
316. Ironically, the history of this legislation indicates that sex was added to the list
of prohibited classifications as a last-minute, unsuccessful attempt by a Southern Senator
to assure defeat of the bill. Offering the amendment, Representative Howard Smith re-
marked: "Now I am very serious about this amendment.. . . I do not think it can
do any harm to this legislation; maybe it can do some good." 110 CONG. REc. 2577
(1964). Representative Smith has since denied that the purpose of the amendment was
to delay voting. See Miller, Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REv. 877, 883 n.34 (1967). See also KANOWiTZ, supra note 275,
at 100-03 (1934).
317. The Act states that it "shall be an unlawful employment practice" for a covered
employer because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin:
1. to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrim-
inate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions
or privileges of employment,. . . or
2. to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee ...
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (Supp. 1974).
In addition, Title VII makes it unlawful for an employment agency to fail or refuse
to refer for employment or otherwise discriminate against any individual because of,
inter alia, sex, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1970), or for a labor organization to cause or
attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual because of, inter alia,
sex. Id. § 2000e-2(c) (3).
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or corporations owned by it, Indian tribes, certain agencies of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and bona fide membership clubs which are exempt
from taxation under 501 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code.81 It also
provides for the creation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission319 (EEOC) to, inter alia, process, investigate, and conciliate
complaints based on employment discrimination.32
Similar to the Discrimination Convention, Title VII contains an ex-
ception known as the bona fide occupational qualification (the BFOQ)
which allows
an employer to hire and employ employees ...on the basis of his
religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion,
sex or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reason-
ably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise .... 321
Litigation3 22 under Title VII has focused primarily on the interpretation
of the BFOQ, on the effect of Title VII on protective state laws and,
more recently, on discrimination in pregnancy-related employment
practices. 323  In accepting the BFOQ as a defense, courts have been
guided by EEOC guidelines which require, inter alia, that the BFOQ
exception be interpreted narrowly3 24 and that individuals be considered
on the basis of individual capacities and not on the basis of characteris-
tics generally attributed to the group.32 5
318. Id. § 2000e(b)-(d).
319. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (Supp. 1974).
320. Id. § 2000e-4(g).
321. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970).
322. Remedies available under Title VII are injunctive and affirmative relief, back
pay, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. 1974), and attorney's fees, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)
(1970).
323. However, in one of the first cases arising under the BFOQ exception, Pan Ameri-
can Airways sought to justify its employment policy of limiting its cabin attendants to
females. Pan American argued that because of the contained environment of the airplane
women were more suited than men to respond to the psychological needs of its passen-
gers. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found such discrimination violative of Title VII
and held that Pan American could not exclude all males simply because most males may
not perform adequately. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
324. The Commission has stated its belief that
the bona fide occupational qualification exception as to sex should be interpreted
narrowly. Labels---"Men's jobs" and "Women's jobs"--tend to deny employment
opportunities unnecessarily to one sex or the other.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1975).
325. The Commission's position on the application of the BFOQ exception is:
(a) The Commission will find that the following situations do not warrant the
application of the bona fide occupational qualification exception:
(i) The refusal to hire a woman because of her sex based on assumptions of
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Unlike the convention which specifically provides that protective
legislation contained in existing conventions and protective legislation
which may be agreed to in the future shall not be deemed discrimina-
tion, Title VII makes no provision for protective legislation. The trend
in the United States has been to invalidate such legislation. So-called
protective legislation was first introduced in the United States at the
turn of the century and was designed to ameliorate the working condi-
tions of both sexes.32 6 However, in 1903, in Lochner v. New York,327
the Supreme Court held that a New York law which had set maximum
working hours for bakers of both sexes violated the due process clause.
Three years later in Muller v. Oregon,32 s the Court sustained protec-
tive legislation limited to women thus paving the way for separate treat-
ment for women in the area of protective legislation. 29
the comparative employment characteristics of women in general. For example,
the assumption that the turnover rate among women is higher than among men.
(ii) The refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped characterizations
of the sexes. Such stereotypes include, for example, that men are less capable
of assembling intricate equipment; that women are less capable of aggressive
salesmanship. The principle of nondiscrimination requires that individuals be
considered on the basis of individual capacities and not on the basis of any char-
acteristics generally attributed to the group.
29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.2(a)(1)(i)-(ii) (1975).
326. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 67-69 (1905) (Harlan, White, Day, JJ., dis-
senting).
327. Id. at 45 (majority opinion).
328. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). The majority opinion stated:
The legislation and opinions referred to in [the Brandeis Brief] may not be,
technically speaking, authorities, and in them is little or no discussion of the consti-
tutional question presented to us for determination, yet they are significant of a
widespread belief that woman's physical structure, and the functions she performs
in consequence thereof, justify special legislation restricting or qualifying the condi-
tions under which she should be permitted to toil.
That woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place
her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious. This is especially
true when the burdens of motherhood are upon her. Even when they are not, by
abundant testimony of the medical fraternity continuance for a long time on her
feet at work, repeating this from day to day, tends to injurious effects upon the
body, and as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-
being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve
the strength and vigor of the race.
Id. at 420-21 (1908).
329. The Supreme Court did not apply the separate treatment doctrine consistently.
In a 1923 case, the Court invalidated a minimum wage law stating:
[W]hile the physical differences must be recognized in appropriate cases, the
legislation fixing hours or conditions of work may properly take them into account,
we cannot accept the doctrine that women of mature age, sui juris, require or may
be subjected to restrictions upon their liberty of contract which could not lawfully
be imposed in the case of men under similar circumstances. To do so would be
to ignore all the implications to be drawn from the present day trend of legislation,
as well as that of common thought and usage, by which woman is accorded emanci-
pation from the old doctrine that she must be given special protection or be sub-
jected to special restraint in her contractual and civil relationships.
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Although the immediate impact of the Muller decision was to up-
grade working conditions for women in the sweatshops, the long range
effect has been to limit opportunity for women in employment. For
that reason and also because many such laws appear to conflict with
the guidelines of the EEOC, a number of these laws are presently under
legal attack. For example, in Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co.,330 the
defendant claimed as a defense in a Title VII action that appointing the
plaintiff to the job she sought would result in a violation of California
labor law which limited the number of hours women could work33' (and
therefore their overtime pay) and the amount of weight women could
lift.332 The court ruled:
We conclude ... that the Commission [EEOC] is correct in determin-
ing that BFOQ establishes a narrow exception inapplicable where, as
here, employment opportunities are denied on the basis of characteri-
zations of the physical capabilities and endurance of women, even when
those characteristics are recognized in state legislation.333
Since Rosenfeld, successful challenges to protective legislation have in-
cluded weight liffting, 3 4 hours of work per day,335 and tending bar. 
33
Thus, the Convention Concerning the Employment of Women -on
Underground Work in Mines of All Kinds,337 which contains a pro-
hibition against employing women in underground mines except in
managerial positions or health and welfare services,338 and the Con-
vention Concerning Night Work of Women Employed in Industry, 
3 3
which prohibits women from working at night with such exceptions as
family ventures3 0 where necessary to prevent rapid deterioration 4' and
where climate makes day work difficult,341 would be inconsistent with
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 553 (1923), overruled in West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
330. 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
331. CAL. LABOR CODE ANN. § 1350 (West 1971).
332. Id. § 1251.
333. 444 F.2d at 1227.
334. Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969).
335. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Grabiec, 317 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. II. 1970).
336. Krause v. Sacramento Inn, 479 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1973).
337. Discussed at notes 105-09 supra and accompanying text.
338. Convention Concerning the Employment of Women in Underground Work in
Mines of All Kinds, adopted June 21, 1935, 40 U.N.T.S. 63, art. 3.
339. See discussion at notes 93-104 supra and accompanying text.
340. Convention Concerning Night Work of Women Employed in Industry, adopted
July 9, 1948, 81 U.N.T.S. 147, art. 2.
341. Id. art. 4.
342. Id. art. 7.
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federal law. As indicated earlier, the "protective" conventions have
been criticized within the ILO as well.348
The Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employ-
ment and Occupation is broader than Title VII. It covers employees
excluded under Title Vf131 and it requires states to pursue a national
policy designed to promote the elimination of discrimination, whereas
Title VII does not require affirmative action in ending discrimina-
tion. The latter deficiency, however, is remedied in some part by
Executive Order 11246, which directs federal government agencies
that contract with private companies or state and local govern-
ments to include non-discrimination clauses in their contracts, and to
monitor the employment policies of the contractors.3 45  The most
widely-reported provision of the Order provides that the contractor will
take affirmative action to ensure the applicants are employed without
regard to race, creed, national origin or sex. 46 Issued by the Presi-
dent, executive orders are not statutes and are without explicit con-
gressional authority; yet they clearly bind the executive branch and
courts have declared that they have the force and effect of law.347
The discriminatory impact of pregnancy-related legislation on em-
ployment practices has been the subject of challenges both under the
Constitution and under Title VII. In Cleveland Board of Education
v. LaFleur,34 s the Supreme Court held unconstitutional school district
rules that required pregnant teachers to take unpaid maternity leave,
commencing four to five months before expected childbirth. However,
such rules were invalidated not because they failed to protect women
from loss of wages or unemployment, but because they were an unjus-
tifiable burden of the exercise of the "freedom of personal choice in
343. See note 118 supra and accompanying text.
344. See note 318 supra and accompanying text.
345. Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 169 (Supp. 1974).
346. During the performance of this contract, the contractor agrees as follows:
(1) The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for em-
ployment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The contractor
will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that em-
ployees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. Such action shall include, but not be limited to the follow-
ing: employment, upgrading, demotion, or transfer, recruitment or recruitment ad-
vertising; layoff or termination; rates of pay or other forms of compensation; and
selection for training, including apprenticeship. The contractor agrees to post in
conspicuous places, available to employees and applicants for employment, notices
to be provided by the contracting officer setting forth the provisions of this nondis-
crimination clause.
Id. at 170.
347. Farkas v. Texas Instrument, Inc., 375 F.2d 629, 632 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 977 (1967).
348. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
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matters of marriage and family life [which] is one of the liberties pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. '340 In Ge-
duldig v. Aiello,a5 0 on the other hand, the Court sustained a California
disability insurance program, which excluded any disability caused by
or arising in connection with pregnancy. Although an equal protection
challenge was made, the Court applied the minimum scrutiny test and
found that the state's legitimate interests in maintaining a self-support-
ing insurance program on adequate levels of distribution for disabilities
covered and a low contribution rate justified a non-comprehensive pro-
gram.35' The EEOC had recognized that employment policies related
to pregnancy have traditionally been sex discrimination in another guise
and in 1972 issued guidelines which bring differential treatment of
pregnancy under the Title VII ban of sex discrimination.3Y2  However
in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,3a 3 the Court repudiated the applica-
ble EEOC guidelines and held that an employer's exclusion of preg-
nancy-related disabilities from the coverage of an employee's disability
income plan did not constitute sex discrimination proscribed by Title
VII. Under some state laws, however, differential 'treatment of a preg-
nancy-related disability is prohibited. For example, the highest court
in New York state has recently held that an employment policy which
singles out pregnancy and childbirth for treatment different from that
accorded other instances of physical or medical impairment or disability
is prohibited by that state's Human Rights Law.854
349. Id. at 639.
350. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
351. Justice Stewart attempted to distinguish the discrimination alleged here from that
in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971):
[T7he California insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibil-
ity because of gender but merely removes one physical condition-pregnancy-from
the list of compensable disabilities.
Id. at 496 n.20.
352. The guidelines provide in pertinent part:
(a) A written or unwritten employment policy or practice which excludes from
employment applicants or employees because of pregnancy is in prima facie viola-
tion of title VII.
(b) Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy . . . are, for all job-re-
lated purposes, temporary disabilities and should be treated as such under any health
or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with
employment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1975).
353. 375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd,
45 U.S.L.W. 4031 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1976). In so ruling, the Court rejected the unanimous
conclusion of all six federal courts of appeals which had addressed the question. 45
U.S.L.W. at 4037 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
354. The Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. New York State Human Rights Appeals Bd.,
176 N.Y.L.J. 1 (N.Y. Ct. of App. Dec. 20, 1976).
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The Convention Concerning Maternity Protection 55 is an employ-
ment-related convention which embodies the same elements of eco-
nomic security as do the EEOC guidelines. Both the convention and
the EEOC guidelines require that pregnancy be treated as any other
temporary disability for purposes of insurance and sick leave. Addi-
tionally, they prohibit dismissal because of pregnancy. However, the
convention also mandates a minimum of twelve weeks compulsory leave,
including at least six weeks after confinement.3 58 In this respect it con-
flicts with the EEOC guidelines as well as with the holding of La-
Fleur.35
7
3. Old Age, Survivors', and Disability Insurance
Old age, survivors' and disability insurance 5 8 (Social Security) legis-
lation was enacted in 1935 as a partial response to widespread eco-
nomic hardship, resulting from the Great Depression. Although indi-
viduals pay Social Security taxes as wage earners, their Social Security
benefits are usually conditioned upon their status as family members.359
This has a discriminatory impact upon married women in two basic
ways: (1) as wage earners, the vast majority of women earn less than
$14,100,380 (the Social Security taxable base maximum) and thus the
entire income of the woman is taxed, and (2) as family members, a
significant percentage of women collect benefits -as a dependent, wife or
widow, rather than as a wage earner. Where a husband is entitled to
maximum benefits and a wife to minimum benefits, or near-minimum
benefits, the couple will receive only the husband's benefit and an allot-
ment for the wife. The wife, in these cases, effectively loses her own
benefits. If each were to collect his or her respective benefits, their
combined Social Security tax would be less. The couples position in
regard to Social Security is not improved because of her having worked
and contributed to the system.3 '
355. Convention Concerning Maternity Protection, adopted June 28, 1952, 214
U.N.T.S. 321. This convention is discussed at notes 110-17 supra and accompanying
text.
356. 214 U.N.T.S. 321, art. 3.
357. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
358. 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1970).
359. C. S. BELL, Women and Social Security: Contributions and Benefits in SEx
DISCRIMINATION AND THEm LAw (1975) [hereinafter cited as BELL].
360. 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2232.
361. In 1971, six million women were retired workers, entitled to their own benefits.
Over one million received supplemental payments instead because they were entitled to
larger sums as the wives of retired workers. Bell illustrated the inequities of the con-
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The conventions concerning compulsory widows' and orphans' insur-
ance362 are likewise permeated by the assumption of a married wom-
an's dependence. The conventions provide that persons not subject to
compulsory insurance may qualify for a pension by voluntary payment
of a fee. In the case of a married woman, the husband, if not subject
to compulsory insurance, is permitted to insure voluntarily and thereby
to qualify his wife for an old-age or widow's pension.
3
1
Both insurance systems likewise condition the woman's eligibility for
a pension on the status of the marriage relationship. A divorced
woman may now receive benefits on her former husband's Social Secu-
rity, if the marriage lasted at least twenty years.80 4 The conventions
permit the widow's pension to be withheld, if at the time of the death
of the insured or pensioned person, the marriage had been dissolved
or if a separation had been obtained in proceedings in which the
woman was found to be solely at fault.365 Clearly, under federal
law366 Social Security survivor's benefits cannot be withheld solely be-
cause the widow was found to be at fault in a proceeding dissolving
the marriage.
tribution-distribution system for women who receive supplemental payments as well as
for those women who collect their own Social Security benefits:
mhe working woman whose husband is paying social security taxes knows that she
is entitled, as his dependent, to retirement and survivor's benefits just as the women
at home who are not gainfully employed. She senses, therefore, and she is quite
correct, an inequity of cost/benefits between herself and women not employed out-
side the home. The inequity can be quantified by calculating the differential bene-
fit. For example, if a retired man's earnings history were such that benefits payable
to him amounted to $354.50 he would be entitled to another $177.30 if he were
married, for the sum payable to a couple at that level is $531.80. If his wife had
established her own eligibility, say to a monthly benefit of $250.60, she would of
course receive that sum, rather than the lower figure, so that total family benefits
would be higher for many couples where both had covered earnings than where only
one did. But the marginal payment to the woman amounts to only $73.30, the dif-
ference between what she would be entitled to as a wife and what she would receive
as a retired worker. The return figured in this way looks very small indeed to an
employed woman.
BELL, supra note 359, at 751.
362. Convention Concerning Compulsory Widows' and Orphans' Insurance for Per.,
sons Employed in Agricultural Undertakings, adopted June 29, 1933, 39 U.N.T.S. 285;
Convention Concerning Compulsory Widows' and Orphans' Insurance for Persons Em-
ployed in Industrial or Commercial Undertakings, in the Liberal Professions and for
Outworkers and Domestic Servants, adopted June 29, 1933, 39 U.N.T.S. 259. These
conventions are discussed at notes 119-26 supra and accompanying text.
363. 39 U.N.T.S. 259, art. 3; 39 U.N.T.S. 285, art. 3.
364. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b), (e), (g), 416(d) (1970).
365. 39 U.N.T.S. 259, art. 7; 39 U.N.T.S. 285, art. 7.
366. The federal income tax structure, like Social Security, is premised on the tradi-
tional model of marriage in which the husband is the sole wage earner. Both taxing
systems discriminate against working married women and consequently against two-
wage-earner families in general. See Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative
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Sex classification bias can be a two-edged sword which disadvantages
members of both sexes. Such has been the experience of widowers
who have attempted to collect benefits on their wives' Social Security.
Until the recent Supreme Court decision in Weinberger v. Wiesen-
feld,367 widowers were ineligible to collect benefits on their wives' Social
Security unless actual dependency was proven. In ruling that a widower
could remain at home to care for his child and collect Social Security
survivor's benefits, Justice Brennan for the majority stated:
Given the purpose of enabling the surviving parent to remain at home
to care for a child, the gender-based distinction of § 402(g) is entirely
irrational. The classification discriminates among surviving children
solely on the basis of the sex of the surviving parent .... It is no less
important for a child to be cared for by its sole surviving parent when
that parent is male rather than female. 368
In contrast there is no provision regarding the collection by a wid-
ower on his wife's insurance in the conventions. 69  The conventions
are a plan to care for dependents and reflects traditional sex-role ster-
eotyping.
C. Marriage
Under our federal system of government, marriage and education
have traditionally been viewed as areas reserved for state regulation
and policy under the tenth amendment. Although federal legislation
in the latter area has become increasingly important in recent years,
-both areas are still fundamentally within the domain of the state legis-
latures. However, as the title suggests, a major part of the Convention
on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration
of Marriages37 deals with basic legal protection of the spouses by such
requirements as minimum age,3 free consent,3 72 solemnization,373 and
Study of Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFFALo L. REv. 49
(1971).
367. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
368. Id. at 1235.
369. Article 8 offers some insight into the thinking of the drafters on the
subject of support by a woman. It provides that children are entitled to a pension upon
the death of the mother only if the mother had contributed to the support of the child
or if she had been a widow. 39 U.N.T.S. 259, art. 8, §§ 1-2; 39 U.N.T.S. 285, art.
8, §§ 1-2.
370. Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage & Registration
of Marriages, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1962, 521 U.N.T.S. 231 (1962). See discus-
sion at notes 134-39 supra and accompanying text.
371. 521 U.N.T.S. 231, Preamble (1).
372. Id. Preamble (2).
373. Id. art. 1(1).
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registration 37 4 of marriage. 375  These legal protections are nearly uni-
versal practice in the United States. In each of the fifty states, there
are statutory requirements that marriage be entered into by freely con-
senting persons of a specific minimum age and that it be licensed, sol-
emnized, authenticated and registered. An exception to this general
rule is found in the recognition of common-law marriage. Although
common-law marriage had once been widespread, by 1968, thirty-six
states by statute or judicial decision refused to recognize the practice. 3 70
Since the convention on marriage admits of deviation to the formal re-
quirements only in exceptional circumstances,377 it might conflict with
the law of those states which continue to recognize the validity of com-
mon-law marriage.
An introductory paragraph to the Convention on Consent of Marriage,
Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriage notes:
Recalling that article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights states that:
(1) Men and Women of full age, without any limitation due to
race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a
family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage
and at its dissolution.3 7
8
In the United States, law, custom and religion have combined to foster
unequal sex-role stereotypes, and therefore sex discrimination, rather
than full equality in the marriage relationship. In recent years,
however, m response to rapidly changing social mores, the law govern-
ing marriage is developing accordingly. Yet, there remains a general
pattern of inequality between the sexes upon entering, during, and in dis-
solving a marriage.
374. Id. art. 3.
375. The fundamental thrust of this convention is actually the elimination of such
practices as childhood betrothal and forced marriage. U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 66/3/Add.
1, at 7 (1975).
376. Common-law marriage is recognized in Alabama, Colorado, District of Colum-
bia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina and Texas. M. PAULSEN, W. WADLINGTON & J. GOEBEL,
JR., CASES & OTHER MATERIALS ON DoMEsTIc RELATIONS 72 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as DoMEsTIc RELATIONS]. Generally, for a marriage to be recognized as a common-
law marriage, it must include the following characteristics: an agreement to be husband
and wife, living together as husband and wife, and holding out to the public that the
couple is husband and wife. See Lancey v. United States, 356 F.2d 407 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 922 (1966).
377. 521 U.N.T.S. 231, art. 1(2).
378. Id. Preamble (1).
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Assumption of the husband's surname 379 and differing qualifying
ages of consent for males and females380 are institutionalized inequali-
ties which affect the terms upon which persons traditionally enter into
marriage in the United States. However, the Supreme Court, in Stan-
ton v. Stanton,3 1 has recently invalidated a state statute382 which re-
quired support payments to be made for a male until the age of twenty-
one and a female until the age of eighteen. Justice Blackmun wrote
for the court:
The test here, then, is whether the difference in sex between children
warrants the distinction in the appellee's obligation to support that is
drawn by the Utah statute. We conclude that it does not. It may be
true... that it is the man's primary responsibility to provide a home and
that it is salutary for him to have education and training before he as-
sumes that responsibility; that girls tend to mature earlier than boys;
and that females tend to marry earlier than males ....
Women's activities and responsibilities are increasing and expanding.
Coeducation is a fact, not a rarity. The presence of women in busi-
ness, in the professions, in government and, indeed, in all walks of
life where education is a desirable, if not always a necessary, ante-
cedent is apparent and a proper subject of judicial notice. If a specified
age of minority is required for the boy in order to assure him parental
support while he attains his education and training, so, too, it is for
the girl.3
83
It would seem that the rationale of the Stanton case would apply
equally to the differing qualifying ages of consent for marriage and thus
a state statute so providing would likewise be vulnerable to an equal
protection challenge.
379. Statutes provide for automatic name change in Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Michi-
gan and Vermont; judicial decision has determined that a name change is automatic in
Alabama and Illinois; statutes allow choice of name change in Florida and New York;
judicial decision has determined that women have a choice in Louisiana, Maryland and
Ohio; a married woman may not change her name by statutory procedure in Iowa and
Kentucky. S. Ross, TAE RIGHTS OF WOMEN, app., chart C (1973).
380. A lower qualifying age for marriage for females has its roots in common law.
Originally the age was set to establish a presumption of ability to consummate. At com-
mon law the age was fourteen for males and twelve for females. DOMESTIc RELATIONS,
supra note 376, at 99. The age for males and females has been made the same by statute
in all but the following states: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, the District of Columbia,
Illinois, Missouri, New York, Oklahoma and Utah. S. ALEXANDER, WOMEN'S LEGAL
RIGHTs 202-14 (1975).
381. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
382. UTAH CODE ANN. § 1035 (1976).
383. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975).
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The common-law fiction of unity of the spouses has propagated se-
rious inequalities in privileges, rights and duties during marriage' 84
Women are still directly and indirectly denied important civil, legal and
economic rights in many states because traditional views of marriage
and the roles of the spouses have been memorialized in statute and case
law. Among the most consequential of these are the husband's right
to choose the domicile385 and the division of responsibilities which allot
the duty to support to the man and the duty to serve to the woman 850
Certain states, including Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii and New Hamp-
shire, now allow women to acquire an independent domicile for all pur-
poses while the majority allow it only for various limited purposes.3 s 7
384. For a detailed treatment of this subject, see KANOWITZ, supra note 275, at 35-99
(1974).
385. In re Paullin, 113 A. 240 (N.J. 1921). Important matters determined by domi-
cile are the rights of voting, holding and running for office, and serving on juries as
well as the liability for certain taxes. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 11 (1971). But cf. Act of Oct. 1, 1973, ch. 987, § 2, 1973 Cal. Stat. 1898, repealing
CAL. Civ. CODE § 5101 (West 1970) which granted the right to chose the place or mode
of living to the husband.
386. Graham v. Graham, 33 F. Supp. 936 (E.D. Mich. 1940). But see In re Mar-
riage of Higgason, 10 Cal. 3d 476, 487-88, 516 P.2d 289, 296-97, 110 Cal. Rptr. 897,
904-05 (1973) in which it was recognized that, in California, under the provisions of
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5132 (West 1970), as amended, CAL. CIV. CODE § 5132 (West Supp.
1976), the wife also has certain obligations to support the husband.
387. All states allow a woman to establish an independent domicile for the purpose
of suing for divorce. For a summary analysis of domicile statutes, see KANOwrrz, supra
note 275, at 48.
Important economic ramifications have arisen from the common law division of re-
sponsibilities between the spouses which assigns support obligations to the husband and
service obligations to the wife. Until very recently the institutionalized expectation that
the husband would be the principal wage earner had resulted in a nearly universal denial
of credit to married women in their own names. Neither had the vast majority of credit
institutions considered a wife's earnings in deciding whether to extend family credit in
the husband's name. See Gates, Credit Discrimination Against Women: Causes and
Solutions, 27 VAry. L. REv. 409, 411 (1974). Affirmative legislative action to extend
credit to creditworthy married women has been taken in at least twenty-two states. These
states include: Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Kansas,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
app. B.
In addition at the federal level, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §
1691 (Supp. V, 1975), has recently amended the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1970) and provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant on the
basis of sex or marital status with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction.
Id. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act became effective October 28, 1975 and thus it
is difficult to assess its impact at this early date,
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Another significant economic incident of marriage is ownership of
property. There are two systems of property ownership by married
couples in the United States: common law and community property.388
Each of these systems contains its own serious economic disadvantage
for women. In common-law states each spouse retains full legal rights
in his or her own separate property. Therefore, a woman has no rights
in her husband's income. In a community property state, by contrast,
the earnings of each spouse usually become part of the community
property. The disadvantage to the woman lies in the fact that the hus-
band has traditionally had exclusive control of the community prop-
erty.38 9 However, recent legislation in five states has enlarged the con-
trol of the wife in the community property.390 The community prop-
erty system is based on a theory of partner relationship. 9 ' Although
attractive in theory, it is disappointing in practice because it fails to pro-
duce equality of result between the spouses.
392
At the dissolution of a marriage, alimony and child custody are still
commonly decided in a sex-based manner under the laws of many
states. At common law, the power to award alimony existed only as
to the support of the wife; it has taken statutory provision to extend
the award of alimony to men where the circumstances were appropri-
ate. 93 In 1968 it was reported that more than one-third of the states
permitted alimony to be awarded to either spouse depending upon the
need of one and the ability of the other to pay. 94
388. Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Wash-
ington are states which have community property laws. See Laughran, Management and
Control of Community Property in California: "Retroactive" Application of the 1975
Amendments, 9 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 493, 493 n.2 (1976).
389. KANoWrrz, supra note 275, at 60-61.
390. K. DAvIDsON, R. GINSBURG & H. KAY, TExr, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEX-
BASED DISCRMInAToN 165 (1974).
391. See KANowrrz, supra note 275, at 61.
392. Younger, Community Property, Women, and Curriculum, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 211,
258 (1973).
393. BABcocx, FREEDMAN, NORTON & Ross, SEx DISCRiMINATION AND THE LAW:
CAUSES AND REmEDiEs 705 (1975).
394. id. Divorce reform statutes in several states likewise provide for greater equality
in the distribution of property upon divorce. For example, the New Jersey statute
states:
In all actions where a judgment of divorce or divorce from bed and board is en-
tered the court may make such award or awards to the parties, in addition to ali-
mony and maintenance to effectuate an equitable distribution of the property, both
real and personal, which was legally nd beneficially acquired by them or either
of them during marriage.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (Supp. 1976).
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A child custody statute is, on the other hand, usually neutral on its
face, providing that the decision be in "the best interests of the
child."3 95 In many jurisdictions, however, the statutes are interpreted
according to the "tender years doctrine," a strong presumption that it
is in the best interest of the child, especially a child of tender years,
to award custody to the mother. In several recent cases the courts re-
jected in theory the doctrine of tender years. Yet these same courts
were unwilling to recognize fact situations in which maternal unfitness
was evidenced, although in similar circumstances, whether wisely or
not, paternal unfitness might have been found. For example, custody
challenges by fathers and other relatives alleging the mother's unfitness
because of adultery,3 96 co-habitation, 9 7 the birth of an illegitimate
child 98 or homosexuality' 9" have been unsuccessful. 00
A comparison of the marriage law in the United States and the Con-
vention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Reg-
istration for Marriages indicates substantial harmony of purpose. Both
seek to extend legal protection to each person involved in a marriage
relationship and the trend is clearly toward equalizing spousal respon-
sibilities and obligations under law.
The Convention on the Nationality of Married Women,40' outlaws
the practice of automatically altering the nationality of a woman be-
cause of the celebration or dissolution of a marriage. As late as 1915,
in MacKenzie v. Hare,40 2 the Supreme Court upheld a 1907 congres-
sional act which provided for a woman's automatic loss of nationality
upon marriage to a foreigner. 40 3 However, in Airoyim v. Rusk, 40 4 the
court invoked fourteenth amendment protection to ensure against
"a congressional forcible destruction of . . . citizenship. 405
In a recent per curiam decision,40 6 the First Circuit held "Afroyim
395. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1976).
396. Feldman v. Feldman, 222 N.W.2d 2 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974).
397. Pendergraft v. Pendergraft, 208 S.E.2d 887 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974).
398. Hagen v. Hagen, 226 N.W.2d 13 (Iowa 1974).
399. Schuster v. Schuster, 1 Family L. Rep. 2004 (Super. Ct. Wash. Sept. 3, 1974).
400. In the absence of specific wording it is difficult to assess the relative weight as-
signed to various factors by the judges in the cases cited at notes 396-99 supra. It may
be significant that the cases have in common both conduct involving sexual practices
and a petition to change a custody decree.
401. See notes 128-33 supra and accompanying text.
402. 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
403. Citizenship Act of 1907, ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228 (repealed 1922).
404. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
405. Id. at 268.
406. Rocha v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 450 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1971).
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v. Rusk clearly refutes the rationale of MacKenzie v. Hare . [and]
that the Supreme Court would now hold the 1907 statute unconstitu-
tional. 4 °7 The statute was repealed years ago, hence, the Court's po-
sition on change of nationality on marriage will probably not be known.
D. Education
Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 (Title X) 40 has
added sex to the list of proscribed discriminations, 40 9 but there are se-
vere limitations which might hamper its possible effectiveness. First,
Title IX sanctions are indirect. A finding of sex discrimination em-
powers any federal agency to terminate or refuse to grant or continue
to assist any recipient as to whom there has been such a finding on
the record after opportunity for a hearing and a failure to comply.
410
Secondly, there is a long list of exceptions to coverage of the Title, in-
cluding religious schools maintaining'sex segregation on the basis of re-
ligious tenets,411 military schools, 41 2 and any school which has been sex
segregated from its inception.1 3 In addition those schools which are
only in the process of sex integration have a seven-year grace period.41 4
The Convention Against Discrimination in Education 415 contains
sweeping statements prohibiting the limitation of a person's educational
opportunities because of, inter alia, sex. The convention is narrower
than Title IX in that it permits the establishment or maintenance of
separate educational systems or institutions, if equivalent, for the sexes.
This is clearly less protective of the rights of females than Title IX and
federal case law. In 1954, the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of
Education410 held with respect to racial segregation that separate was
inherently unequal in the field of education. In Kirstein v. Rector and
Visitors of the University of Virginia,41 7 female plaintiffs were success-
ful in their suit to sex integrate the University of Virginia because it
was found that the University offered courses not available elsewhere
in the state system and also because the degree offered by the Univer-
407. Id. at 947.
408. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1974).
409. Id. § 1681(a).
410. Id. § 1682.
411. Id. § 1681(a)(3).
412. Id. § 1681(a)(4).
413. Id. § 1681(a) (5).
414. Id. § 1681(a)(2)(B).
415. See notes 66-72 supra and accompanying text.
416. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). "
417. 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970). - - -
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sity of Virginia carried greater prestige than that of any other school
in the state system. On the other hand, male plaintiffs were unsuccess-
ful in their suit against South Carolina's policy of maintaining Winthrop
College as an all-female institution. 418  The court distinguished this
case from Kirstein, finding that the all-female college offered neither
greater tangible nor intangible benefits than schools open to males
throughout the state system. The over-all results of these challenges
are "at best a limited recognition of the right to equal educational op-
portunity regardless of sex." '419
The convention is broader in its reach than Title IX in that it applies
to all educational facilities whether or not governmental assistance is
involved. However, since the vast majority of educational facilities in
the United States receive federal assistance, the scope of Title IX in
the area of education is virtually pervasive.
420
V. SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION
IN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
As the preceding discussion indicates, there are a significant number
of international agreements dealing with women's rights. 421 Some
mandate equality for women in various aspects of the political, eco-
nomic, and educational spheres; others provide specific protection for
418. Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 951
(1971).
419. Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective,
46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 675, 721 (1971).
420. Scholastic athletic programs, traditionally sex-segregated, have come under attack
in a number of jurisdictions by girls who have been excluded from boys' teams. It has
been held a denial of equal protection to exclude qualified girls from participating in
all-boy non-contact sports. Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 477 F.2d 1292 (8th
Cir. 1973). But where a girls' team existed, although admittedly devoid of the "concen-
tration and competitive emphasis characteristic of boys' extracurricular sports," a ra-
tional test was applied to defeat the girls' equal protection claims. Bucha v. Illinois
High School Ass'n, 351 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
Likewise, the Sixth Circuit refused to order integration of contact sports. Morris v.
Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 472 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1973). Administrative agencies
and state legislatures have been somewhat responsive to the discriminatory impact on
girls of sex-segregated sports programs. New York allows mixed competition in non-
contact sports where separate teams do not exist. In exceptional cases the chief admin-
istrative officer of the school may allow a girl(s) to participate on the boys' team even
where a girls' team does exist. Regs. of the Comm'ner of Educ. § 135.4. Michi-
gan has effected substantially the same policy by legislation. MicH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 340.379(2) (Supp. 1972). Although in total the gains have been slight,
girls have won the right to participate in boys' non-contact sports where no independent
girls' team exists. See 57 MINN. L. Ray. 339 (1972-73).
421. See notes 1-168 supra and accompanying text.
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women with respect to such matters as nationality, marriage, maternity,
white slavery, night work, underground work, and pensions. Many of
these agreements have been widely ratified.
Though some opposed to the United States ratification of human
rights conventions have so argued, there is clearly no constitutional
impediment to ratification. Whether the United States should ratify
any of the treaties discussed is therefore a question of policy. Since
the ratification of a treaty has both domestic and foreign affairs effects,
the decision should depend on whether ratification would achieve de-
sired domestic or foreign affairs goals. It is believed that ratification of
some of the treaties discussed would have salutory effects in both
areas.
Those engaged in the conduct of United States foreign affairs, and
particularly those representing the United States in the United Nations,
have indicated that the United States failure to ratify human rights
treaties has exposed it to attack by other countries and has hurt it inter-
national standing. Ratification of any human rights treaties, including
those on women's rights would no doubt improve the United States' in-
ternational image. Moreover, since treaties become the supreme law
of the United States, ratification of international treaties barring dis-
crimination against women in various areas would bar such domestic
discrimination and, to the extent that domestic law does not already
do so, would enhance the rights of women.
Both the Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Em-
ployment and Occupation and Title VII bar discrimination in employ-
ment.4-2 The Convention is broader than Title VII, however, in two
respects: (1) it is not limited to "covered employees," but applies to
everyone, and (2) unlike Title VII, it requires states to take affirmative
action to end the discrimination. While the latter deficiency in Title VII
has been remedied in part by executive order, this order could be
rescinded at any time. As to protective legislation, although Article 5 of
the convention permits states to adopt protective legislation, it does not
require states to do so. This position would not necessarily conflict with
the United States position that some forms of protective legislation are
discriminatory. However, a statement at the time of ratification to the
effect that the United States does not subscribe to Article 5 insofar as
it is inconsistent with United States law might be advisable.
422. See notes 315-57 supra and accompanying text.
68 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10
The Convention on Equal Remuneration for Men and Women
Workers for Work of Equal Value is consistent with the applicable pro-
visions of Title VII and of the Equal Pay Act. Ratification of the con-
vention would reinforce existing laws as well as provide equal treat-
ment for those not covered by the federal statutes.42
The Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Mar-
riage and Registration of Marriages deals with matters that have tradi-
tionally been regulated by state rather than federal law in the United
States.424 However, the rights specifically provided therein are already
nearly universal practice in the United States. Although the conven-
tion, in its introductory section, quotes the Article of the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights to the effect that "men and women . . . are
entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its disso-
lution," this is not one of the operative articles of the convention. It
is merely a goal which the states party to the convention seek to pro-
mote rather than a binding agreement. Moreover, while the goal of
equality in marriage and dissolution has not yet been fully achieved in
the United States, court decisions and state legislation in a number of
states ,tend toward this direction. Ratification of the convention would
constitute a reaffirmation of the principle of equality, thereby giving
support to the judicial and legislative trend.
The Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, which pro-
tects a woman against the automatic loss of her nationality if she mar-
ries a man of another nationality, appears to parallel United States law
on the subject.42 5 However, ratification of the treaty would have the
effect of clarifying the law in this country and establishing a sound
basis for such law.
The above conventions are fairly specific, each deals with a particular
area of discrimination, and they are consistent with the policy and laws
of the United States which attempt to eliminate discrimination in those
areas. Ratification of these conventions would have the effect of more
firmly securing rights for American women and of internationally com-
mitting the United States to equality for women in the respective areas.
Both the Convention Against Discrimination in Education and Title
IX bar discrimination in educational opportunity. The convention is,
however, broader than Title IX since it would apply to all educational
423. See notes 308-14 supra and accompanying text.
424. See notes 378-400 supra and accompanying text.
425. See notes 401-07 supra and accompanying text.
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institutions, not just to those receiving federal aid. Although the con-
vention sanctions separate educational facilities if they are equal, the
convention does not require segregated facilities. This concept has, of
course, been rejected by the Supreme Court insofar as racial segregation
is concerned and at least qualifiedly with respect to sexual discrimina-
tion. Therefore, to the extent that maintenance of segregated facilities,
on racial or sexual grounds, is inconsistent with United States law, the
provision of the convention would simply have no domestic effect.
However, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education goes well
beyond a broad mandate for equality in educational opportunity. Some
of its other provisions are consistent both with United States practice
at home and its aims abroad, such as the requirement for free and com-
pulsory primary education, but other provisions are inconsistent with
United States practice and policy. For example, the provision in Arti-
cle 3 barring "any difference of treatment by the public authorities...
in the matter of school fees and the grant of scholarships," except on
the basis of need or merit, would seem to proscribe affirmative action
programs, now widespread but the subject of considerable controversy
and litigation in the United States. The provision in Article 4 re-
quiring the parties "to ensure that the standards of education are
equivalent in all public educational institutions of the same level,"
would appear to require equalization of educational standards and facil-
ities both within and between the states of the United States. The con-
troversial nature of these provisions makes it highly unlikely that the
United States would wish to ratify this convention at this time.
The Convention Concerning Night Work of Women Employed in In-
dustry, the Convention Concerning the Employment of Women on Un-
derground Work in Mines, and the Convention Concerning Maternity
Protection bar women from working at night, underground, or during
specified periods before and after giving birth. Ratification of these
conventions would deny women various employment opportunities,
thereby extending rather than diminishing discrimination against
women. Clearly, ratification of these conventions is counter-indicated.
Similarly, there is no need for United States ratification of the various
conventions dealing with old age, orphans' and widows' insurance, since
United States law, though in need of modification to the extent that
it discriminates against married women, already affords equal or better
protection than that provided for in the conventions.
The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are both extremely broad in
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scope, encompassing a vast array of civil, political, economic and
cultural rights. The provisions mandating equality for women are
only one aspect of these agreements. Moreover, many of the provi-
sions pertaining to women are already covered in narrower agreements
dealing with the rights of women and are fully covered in the draft
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women. While the United States will no doubt wish to give serious
consideration to ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
provisions dealing with women's rights should not be the determinative
factor in the decision.
VI. CONCLUSION
Advocates of equality for women in the United States have sought
to achieve this goal through litigation, through state and federal legis-
lation, and, most strenuously perhaps, through efforts for ratification of
the Equal Rights Amendment. The efforts to obtain ratification of the
Equal Rights Amendment have not succeeded thus far and indeed ap-
pear to have suffered a set back. The rights of women have neverthe-
less expanded in recent years primarily as a result of judicial decisions
and legislation. The ratification of treaties as a means of obtaining
equality for women in the United States appears to have been largely
neglected. Ratification of the Convention Concerning Discrimination
in Respect of Employment and Occupation, the Convention on Equal
Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value,
the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage
and Registration of Marriages, and the Convention on the Nationality
of Married Women, would affirm and extend the rights of women in
these areas.426 Those concerned with women's rights in the United
States and internationally should also urge active participation by the
United States in the drafting of the Convention on Elimination of Dis-
crimination Against Women to ensure a meaningful convention which
would provide equality for women in all areas of major significance
and which would be consistent with United States policy. These con-
ventions clearly warrant the attention of those who seek to eliminate
sex based discrimination in the United States as well as of those who
believe the United States should play a more active role in the pro-
motion of human rights internationally.
426. See notes 428-32 supra and accompanying text.
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The ratification of the Convention on Political Rights of Women
and the American Bar Association's reversal of its long standing op-
position to the Genocide Convention may be the beginning of a new
United States approach to human rights conventions.
